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Why Worry About Professionalism?
Michael H. Rubin
McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
1. Ethics vs. Professionalism - An Overview
There has been a rampant rise in regard for the concept of "profes-
sionalism."
There has been reams of paper in journals and law reviews devoted
to discussing and parsing the distinctions "ethics" and "professionalism.
The discussion has not been confined to Louisiana courts' and to bar as-
sociations.2
1 The Louisiana Code of Professionalism was incorporated into the Louisiana Dis-
trict Court Rules, Rule 6.2. Rule 6.3 is the "Code of Professionalism in the Courts.".
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXX(3), concerning mandatory continuing legal
education, discusses the difference between ethics and professionalism:
"Legal ethics concerns the standard of professional conduct and responsibility re-
quired of a lawyer. It includes courses on professional responsibility and malprac-
tice. It does not include such topics as attorneys' fees, client development, law of-
fice economics, and practice systems, except to the extent that professional respon-
sibility is discussed in connection with these topics.
Professionalism concerns the knowledge and skill of the law faithfully employed in
the service of client and public good, and entails what is more broadly expected of attor-
neys. It includes courses on the duties of attorneys to the judicial system, courts, public,
clients, and other attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations.
Legal ethics sets forth the standards of conduct required of a lawyer; professional-
ism includes what is more broadly expected. The professionalism CLE requirement is
distinct from, and in addition to, the legal ethics CLE requirement."
2 The LSBA's Code of Professionalism can be found at http://www.lsba.org/2007
MemberServices/codeofprofessionalism.asp and states, in full:
My word is my bond. I will never intentionally mislead the court or other counsel. I
will not knowingly-make statements of fact or law that are untrue.
* I will clearly identify for other counsel changes I have made in documents sub-
mitted to me.
* I will conduct myself with dignity, civility, courtesy and a sense of fair play.
* I will not abuse or misuse the law, its procedures or the participants in the judi-
cial process.
* I will consult with other counsel whenever scheduling procedures are required
and will be cooperative in scheduling discovery, hearings, the testimony of wit-
nesses and in the handling of the entire course of any legal matter.
* I will not file or oppose pleadings, conduct discovery or utilize any course of
conduct for the purpose of undue delay or harassment of any other counsel or party.
I will allow counsel fair opportunity to respond and will grant reasonable requests
for extensions of time.
* I will not engage in personal attacks on other counsel or the court. I will support
- 108 -
1
Rubin: Why Worry About Professionalism?
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2009
Across the nation, there are non-binding "codes of conduct" or
"codes of civility" or "lawyer's creeds" or "codes of professionalism."
This mushrooming mound of aspirational goals, ubiquitous promises of
mannered behavior, and grand phrases indicate that the legal profession
deems itself to be in a crisis. There are a plethora of publications profess-
ing the palliative of professionalism as a panacea for the perils of prac-
tice.3
What is the nature of the apparent crisis that has caused the rise in
"professionalism" concerns and why does it require the reaction that has
been engendered?
A basic problem is in the use of the term "professionalism." No
standard definition of "professionalism" is available. Writers of periodi-
my profession's efforts to enforce its disciplinary rules and will not make un-
founded allegations of unethical conduct about other counsel.
* I will not use the threat of sanctions as a litigation tactic.
* I will cooperate with counsel and the court to reduce the cost of litigation and
will readily stipulate to all matters not in dispute.
* I will be punctual in my communication with clients, other counsel and the court,
and in honoring scheduled appearances.
The reader will note a definite tilt towards alliteration in this paragraph. As Justice
Cardoza noted, in discussing legal opinions (but using a concept applicable to all effec-
tive writing): "The opinion will need persuasive force, or the impressive virtue of sincer-
ity and fire, or the mnemonic power of alliteration and antithesis, or the terseness and
tang of the proverb and the maxim." P.H. Dunn, "How Judges Overrule: Speech Act
Theory And The Doctrine Of Stare Decisis," 113 Yale L.J. 493 (2003), citing Benjamin
N. Cardozo, Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses 9 (1931).
For essays and articles on professionalism, in addition to those noted in the next
footnote, see:
Durham, "Promoting The Standards Of Professionalism And Civility," 19 Utah
B.J. 8 (2006); McMahon, "Declining Professionalism In Court: A Comparative
Look At The English Barrister," 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 845 (2006); Corn, "Les-
sons From The Law Of War: A New Perspective On The "Legal Warrior's" Code
Of Professionalism," 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 781 (2006); Kennedy, Lantin & York,
"Professionalism: Dealing With Unprofessional Conduct In Bankruptcy," 36 U.
Mem. L. Rev. 575 (2006); Schofield, "Practice & Professionalism Tips From A
Mediator, Arbitrator And Appraiser," I Trial Advoc. Quarterly (2006); Gunnars-
son, "Professionalism: Judges' Pet Peeves," 94 Ill. B.J. 20 (2006); Alvarado, "A
Radical Proposal For Lifetime Professionalism," 37 St. Mary's L.J. 1053 (2006);
Johnson, "Applying The Standards Of Professionalism And Civility To The Prac-
tice Of Criminal Law, 18 DEC Utah B.J. 28 (2005); Rhode, "Profits and Profes-
sionalism," 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 49 (2005); Uelmen, "T'he Evils Of "Elasticity":
Reflections On The Rhetoric Of Professionalism And The Part Time Paradox In
Large Firm Practice," 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 81 (2005); Creamer, "Professionalism:
The Next Level," 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1539 (2005); Ames, "Concerns About The Lack
Of Professionalism: Root Causes Rather Than Symptoms Must Be Addressed," 28
Am. J. Trial Advoc. 531 (2005); and Barton, "The ABA, The Rules, And Profes-
sionalism: The Mechanics Of Self Defeat And A Call For A Return To The Ethical,
Moral, And Practical Approach Of The Canons," 83 N.C. L. Rev. 411(2005).
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cal and law review articles cannot agree on any particular and limited
definition;4 the reaction is more akin to the famous statement of Justice
Potter Stewart, who, in speaking of pornography, said "I know it when I
see it."5
On the one hand, there are those who argue that the entire concept
of professionalism is illusive and self-defeating, a tacit admission that the
Bar either cannot or should not make its members abide by any standards
more stringent than that imposed by statutes and the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.6 Contrast these views to those who advocate that profes-
sionalism can and should be taught, that professionalism is what you
ought to do while ethics are what you are required to do.
Should there be a tension between "ethics" and "professionalism"?
Are the two different concepts or part of a single continuum? This paper
explores these issues.
2. Professionalism Lauded by Courts
It is not as if acts of professionalism go unnoticed by the courts. Jus-
tice Souter has written that "the right against ineffective assistance of
counsel has as much to do with public confidence in the professionalism
of lawyers as with the results of legal proceedings."7
There are numerous cases where courts have praised counsel for
acts of professionalism. These include:
* A case involving complex issues and over 200 petitions for review
of FERC orders:
4 Rizzardi, "Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?" 79 Fl. B.J. 38
(2005); Ciolini, "Redefining Professionalism as Seeking"," 49 Loyola L. Rev. 229
(2003); -Ravenal, "The Contagion of Example: Attacking the Root of the Problem in
Lawyer Professionalism 31 Federal Lawyer (2002); Bien, "A New Way for Courts to
Promote Professionalism", 86 Judicature 132 (2002); Coleman, "Professionalism Within
the Profession," 65 Tex. B.J. 926 (2002); Sturman, "Professionalism: We Know it When
We See It," 6 Nevada Lawyer (2002); Bronson, "Professionalism is a Choice," 23 Mon-
tana Lawyer (2002); Vincent, "Aspirational Morality: the Ideals of Professionalism, April
Utah B.J. 24 (2002); Harris, "The Professionalism Crisis--the 'Z' Words And Other
Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices' Solution," 53 S.C. L. Rev. 549 (2002);
Spivey, "Ethics: Lawyering and Professionalism," 33 St. Mary's L.J. 721 (2002); Harris,
"The Professionalism Crisis," 3 Prof. Lawyer 1 (2001); Morgan, "Real World Pressures
on Professionalism," 23 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 409 (2001); Berry, "Civility and
Professionalism," Nevada Lawyer (Nov. 2002).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
6 See, e.g., Wittmann,"Should "Professionalism" Be Mandatory? Can Civility Be
Taught?", 45 La. B. Journal 19 (1997); Alston, "The Ten Commandments of Profession-
alism: a Misguided Effort," 4 Prof. Lawyer 24 (2002); Morgan, "What Needs Fixing?
Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 947 (2002); and
Wangen, "Professionalism and Other Myths," March Oregon St. Bar Bulletin 78 (1999).
7 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 207 (2001), Justice Souter, dissenting.
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"We also express our appreciation to the parties and their attorneys
for their cooperation, professionalism, and the quality of their pres-
entations." 8
* A hotly contested case where the lawyers were able to enter into
stipulations:
"In an admirable display of their attorneys' professionalism, the par-
ties submitted their remaining disputes to the district court upon sti-
pulated facts."9
* A difficult matter that could have degenerated had it not been for the
skill of the lawyers:
"We commend both attorneys in this difficult case for their profes-
sionalism. They skillfully litigated the contentious issues and zeal-
ously represented their clients without sacrificing civility, a linchpin
of our legal system.... We applaud their devotion to the highest
standards of the law."' 0
* A matter on an expedited schedule:
Although the parties were under significant time pressure, both par-
ties supplied thorough and thoughtful briefs and made excellent oral
presentations. The panel expresses its appreciation to counsel for
their professionalism.'
* Praise of the government in a criminal case:
"In its brief, the Government states it does not oppose resentencing
in this case. We commend the United States Attorney's Office for its
candor and professionalism." 2
* And even praise in the politically-charged Terri Schiavo case:
"Finally, the court would be remiss if it did not once again convey
its appreciation for the difficulties and heartbreak the parties have
endured throughout this lengthy process. The civility with which
this delicate matter has been presented by counsel is a credit to their
professionalism and dedication to their respective clients, and Ter-
Public Utilities Comn of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 462 F.3d 1027, 1034, (9th Cir.
2006)
9 Hofer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. OfAmerica, 441 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 2006).
l Wilson v. Airtherm Products, Inc., 436 F.3d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 2006, cert. den. 127
S.Ct. 182, (2006).
" Beardslee v. Brown, 393 F.3d 1032, 2035 (9th Cir. 2004), cert den 543 U.S. 1096,
125 S.Ct. 982, 160 L.Ed.2d 910 (2005).
12 US. v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2004).
" Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1302 (1Ith Cir. 2005), rehear-
ing en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005), rehearing denied, 404 F.3d 1282
(1Ith Cir. 2005), stay denied 544 U.S. 957, 125 S.Ct. 1722, 61 L.Ed.2d 541 (2005).
- 111 -
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The question is, however, are the acts of professionalism that these
courts acknowledge so profusely the norm, or are they rather extraordi-
nary events?
3. A Lack of Professionalism Criticized by Courts
It appears that a lack of professionalism is something that is seen as
being endemic. Justice O'Connor has said that, " 'in films, lawyers are
depicted as unethical, as "bad professionals," and that "not too many
Americans even remember that our society once actually trusted and re-
spected lawyers.' She opined that "the decline of professionalism is
partly responsible for this state of things."' 4
Courts continually bemoan the lack of professionalism that lawyers
demonstrate, seeing fit to remonstrate counsel in their opinions. See, for
example:
* Criticism of a lawyer's violation of the Louisiana Code of Profes-
sionalism:
"Plaintiffs original post-trial brief states that the attorneys for the
defendant coached and rehearsed the testimony of [two witnesses]
during at least five pre-trial meetings 'in addition to their sessions
together to get their stories straight" and that the defense had "con-
cocted a rather amazing mosaic of defenses.' In his Reasons for
Judgment, the trial judge concluded there was no evidence in the re-
cord to support the repeated allegations of coaching, concocting, re-
hearsing made in plaintiffs post-trial brief. The trial court made its
findings after a full hearing on defendant's Motion to Strike in
which both parties presented their positions. We find that the trial
judge was in the best position to evaluate the professionalism of
counsel's conduct. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's judg-
ment finding plaintiffs attorney violated Rule 7 of the Code of Pro-
fessionalism."' 5
* A criticism of a lawyer's lack of professionalism in dealing with
associates.
"Rather than using his experience as a senior member of the bar to
foster the highest ideals of professionalism in the younger attorneys
working under him, respondent used these attorneys as pawns in his
scheme. In addition to the harm to the countless clients who were
14 Garcia v. Teitler, 2004 WL 1636982 (E.D. N.Y. 2004), [aff'd 443 F.3d 202 (2nd
Cir. 2006) citing "W. Dale Nelson, O'Connor: Lawyers 'unhappy lot, Casper Star Trib.,
Mar. 17, 2004, available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2004/03/17/
news/wyominglababfb532515191d87256e5a000caac8.txt (last visited July 20, 2004)."
is Siliezar v. East Jefferson General Hospital, 04-939 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/05), 894
So.2d 373, 381.
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unknowingly drawn into his solicitation scheme, respondent's activi-
ties caused grave harm to the entire legal profession in Louisiana." 6
* Lack of professionalism evidenced by a liwyer's inappropriate lan-
guage in a brief.
"However, we grant the motion for sanctions and order that footnote
1 on page 4 and the entire conclusion on page 23 of .. . [the] brief
be stricken. In representing their clients, attorneys must act within
the bounds of professionalism. We condemn the sort of unprofes-
sional conduct evidenced in the brief submitted to this court. It is
clearly inappropriate and unprofessional for [counsel] to utilize [the]
appellate brief as a platform for casting aspersions on the integrity
of the Family Court and the judiciary.17
* Concern about a potential lack of professionalism, but relegating the
matter to the bar association.
"Beyond the issues addressed above, we are concerned about the
tactics that appellant has used to perfect his appeal. These tactics in-
clude accusing the trial court of altering the trial transcript and ac-
cusing the trial court of bias and prejudice in its conduct of the trial.
Both of these accusations would constitute serious ethical miscon-
duct if they had proved true. However, neither of these charges were
supported by one scintilla of evidence in the record. Such baseless
allegations are insulting and offensive. They also reflect badly on
lawyers as a profession and our system of jurisprudence as a whole.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently approved the Code of Pro-
fessionalism. Article 7 of that Code continues to emphasize that an
attorney "should not engage in personal attacks on other counsel or
the court." A lawyer's conduct should be characterized at all times
by personal courtesy and professional integrity embodied in this
Code. Appellant's groundless allegations about the trial judge clear-
ly violate the Code of Professionalism. With respect to whether
these allegations breach other applicable professional standards of
conduct for lawyers, we defer that determination to the Disciplinary
Board of the Louisiana State Bar Association."]8
* Cautioning counsel not to commit acts of unprofessionalism in the
future.
The content of plaintiffs brief is detailed and profuse with allega-
tions of professional misconduct, unethical and illegal behavior.
Such allegations are insulting and offensive. Furthermore, these
16 In Re O'Keefe, 2003-3195 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So.2d 79, 88.
17 Stroscher v. Stroscher, 2001-2769 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 518, 527-
528.
18 Fox v. Lam, 25,616 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/23/94), 632 So.2d 877, 879-880.
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scandalous allegations are compounded by the fact that they are to-
tally uncorroborated by any evidence. Thus, without any record evi-
dence to support such offensive allegations, plaintiff counsel's brief
is offensive to this court and in violation of Rule 2-12.4.
Whether to impose sanctions under this Rule is within the discretion
of this Court. However, because it is [counsel's] first violation of
our internal rules, we choose not to hold him in contempt. Rather,
this Court reprimands [counsel] and directs him to consider care-
fully before filing a brief accusing a fellow member of the bar of
ethical misconduct without any supporting evidence. Such trans-
gressions will result in sanctions in the future.19
* A complaint about a lack of candor:
"We do not know why counsel for Hi Tech thought it appropriate to
refrain from informing this court of matters so germane to this ap-
peal, but we are certainly troubled by the level of professionalism
and apparent lack of candor it reflects." 20
* A remand order with some real "teeth":
"Nevertheless, we suggest that upon remand the district court may
wish to inquire as to whether that schedule can be substantially ex-
pedited, given the fact that the parties have already had many
months within which to conduct discovery. We also express the
hope that on remand counsel will proceed in an atmosphere of co-
operation and approach the case with common sense and profes-
sionalism. Their goal should be to achieve the client's objectives
without inappropriate conduct, unnecessary filings, insults and ref-
erences to complete irrelevancies." Activities of this type detract
from the object of the litigation, i.e., the fair, full and prompt resolu-
tion of the parties' differences, and create needless expense for the
litigants. {Footnote 3 }
{Footnote 3}We direct this remark particularly at counsel for
plaintiff, whose own inequitable conduct squandered the in-
junctive relief initially granted to J-Rich. In addition, counsel
for plaintiff has persistently mischaracterized both this court's
and the district court's prior orders in this case and has directed
accusations at both courts and opposing counsel in his filings,
as well as matters having nothing to do with the merits of the
case. We remind counsel of his duty, as an officer of the court,
"to proceed only by means that are truthful and honorable, and
19 Galle v. New Orleans School Board, 693 So.2d 692, 696.
20 Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 309 (3rd Cir. 2004).
-114-
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to avoid offensive personality." Mich. Rules of Profl Conduct
R. 6.5 cmt. (2002).
4. What Does "Professionalism" Have to Do with Negotiations?
Are we required to lie for our clients? Of course not. But are we re-
quired to negotiate forcefully for our clients? Lawyers do this every day
in a variety of circumstances -- in contract negotiations; in alternative
dispute resolution tribunals; and as part of the litigation process.
"Ethics" is the term that is commonly applied to lectures about the
ABA's Rules of Professional Responsibility and its predecessor, the
Code of Professional Conduct. These Rules, however, do not use the
word "ethics" at all. The three main federal rules and statutes that regu-
late sanctionable conduct (FRCP 11, FRAP 38, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927) do
not use the term "ethics" either.
The problem is that there is an unresolved tension between two con-
cepts: (a) the need to represent the client fully and zealously and to main-
tain client confidences, and (b) the expectation of some members of the
public and press, and of some federal regulators, that lawyers, as officers
of the Court, should reveal matters that can cause losses to others. These
two concepts are inherently irreconcilable; you cannot fully protect one
without eviscerating the other. The greater the protection one gives to
client confidences, the less "truth" the lawyer is able to reveal, for any
revelation of a client confidence is a breach of that obligation. On the
other hand, the more one seeks to have lawyers disclose information that
may prevent losses to non-clients, the less protection a client has for the
confidences reposed in and disclosed to the lawyer.
"I don't see why we should not come out roundly and say that one of the
functions of the lawyer is to lie for his client; and on rare occasions, as I
think I have shown, I believe it is." Charles Curtis, "The Ethics of Advo-
cacy."22
These two tensions are apparent by looking at what some have said
about a lawyer's role.
* "To mislead an opponent about one's true settling point is the
essence of negotiation." White, MacElvelly "Ethical Limita-
tions on Lying in Negotiations," 1980 American Bar Founda-
tion RES.J. 926, 928.
* Justice Stevens: "I still believe that most lawyers are wise
enough to know that their most precious assets is their profes-
sional reputation." 23
21 J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, Inc., 98 Fed.Appx. 444, 448 (6th Cir.
2004).
22 LYING, Bok, Sissela, pg. 306 & 307, Vintage Books, Second Edition, 1999.
23 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 413, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2464-65
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* "Just as the orderly and systematic slaughter which we call war
is thought perfectly right under certain circumstances, though
painful and revolting: so in the word-contests of the law-
courts, the lawyer is commonly held to be justified in untruth-
fulness within strict rules and limits: for an advocate is thought
to be over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be
false, if he is instructed to say it." H. Sidgwick, The Methods
ofEthics, 7th Ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1907).
* "We might exercise our supervisory powers if we thought there
were an ethical violation involved." But the Court would not
exercise supervisory powers for a breach of a potential profes-
sional violation. US. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 732 (2nd Cir.
1994), cert. den. 513 U.S. 862 (1994).24
5. A Brief History of the ABA Model Rules
In ascertaining whether there always has been a dichotomy between
ethics and professionalism, it is instructive to look at the history of bar
promulgations on the subject.
The American Bar Association's original Canon of Professional
Ethics was adopted on August 27, 1908 and can be traced back to the
Alabama Bar Association's 1887 Code of Ethics and from there back to
two books published in 1836 and 1854.25 For almost a hundred years the
Canons formed the touchstone of lawyer conduct.
The Canons evolved in 1969 into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Code was divided into "Ethical Considera-
tions," aspirational goals for attorneys, written in hortatory language, and
"Disciplinary Rules," mandatory provisions akin to penal statutes which
formed the basis for disciplinary proceedings.
Among the laudatory goals and formulations that the "Ethical Con-
siderations" articulated were:
* "Maintaining the integrity and improving the competence of the bar to
meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of every lawyer."
EC 1-1.
(1990), Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
24 The alleged breach was a prosecutor talking to a witness during an adjournment;
the Court find no problem with this since the issue was elicited by the prosecutor on re-
direct and the witness was subjected to cross-examination on this topic.
25 A history of the ABA's rules can be found in ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Second Edition, pages 1-2 (1992), published by American Bar
Association's Center for Professional Responsibility. The two books were: PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs, by Judge George Sharswood (1854), and A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed.
1836) by David Hoffman.
-116-
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* "A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and
should encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should be temperate
and dignified. . . ." EC 1-5.
* "To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a
platitude." EC 1-5.
* "A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede
to reasonable requests . .. which do not prejudice the rights of his client.
He should follow local customs of courtesy and practice, unless he gives
timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so." EC 7-38.
* "A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to
make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it." EC 7-23.
* "Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in
a proceeding before a tribunal ... is inconsistent with the fair administra-
tion of justice, and it should never be participated in or condoned by
lawyers." EC 8-5.
* "Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves,
are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism." EC
8-6.
* "When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should deter-
mine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profes-
sion." EC 9-2.
* "Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of
his profession; to encourage respect for the law and the courts and the
judges thereof; . . . to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal
profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients
and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety
but also the appearance of impropriety." EC 9-6.
In 1983 the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Gone were the aspirational goals that the Ethical Considerations illumi-
nated. In their place were purely minimal standards of conduct written in
the style of a penal code - the three phrases used are: "a lawyer shall
not," "a lawyer shall," and "a lawyer may." The Bar's transformation
was complete. It had come full circle from a profession whose members
took it for granted that they owed duties to the public and to the courts, to
one whose written rules provided both high-minded guidelines as well as
disciplinary rules, to one whose sole guidance was now found in a quasi-
criminal statute.
At the same time as the Bar's own rules were evolving, a similar
evolution was taking place in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
major shift occurred in 1983 (the same year that the ABA adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct) when Rule 11 was amended to
- 117 -
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become a penal provision allowing sanctions to be imposed against
counsel. The former version of the rule had been rarely used even in the
early 1980s, although there was a strong feeling that lawyers were abus-
ing the system 26 and a perceived need to put corrective measures in
place. The Rule was amended again in 1993, "motivated by a desire to
curb some of the abuses surrounding Rule 11 motion practice.,2 7
Under the Federal Rules as well as state disciplinary procedures,
only conduct of an egregious nature is dealt with. Unfortunately, because
the old Code was rightly called one of "Professional Ethics," we tend to
think that the current Model Rules are also ethical standards; they are
not. An attorney can take positions that many would find uncivil or even
morally questionable and still abide by the Model Rules. Likewise, an
attorney can have a reputation in the bar as an unfair "hardball" litigator,
intransigent on every issue, even ones of courtesy, and still comply with
Rule 11. This may be the reason for the evolution of the "professional-
ism" standards and the various codes of courtesy that are being adopted
by many local bar associations around the country. Although it must be
admitted that not all such "professionalism" codes are limited to litiga-
tion, when one reviews them as a whole, it is clear that abusive litigation
conduct is at the heart of what such formulations are designed to address.
In 2002 the ABA adopted its most current version of the Model
Rules, the Ethics 2000 version (E2K).
6. The Current Model Rules and "Truthfulness"
To some, calling the Model Rules "ethical" rules is a misnomer, for
the Rules allow for questionable behavior from a moral outlook that is
defensible only when looked at from the dual viewpoints of the adversar-
ial process and the perceived need to preserve client confidences. To
some, calling the Model Rules "ethical" rules is a misnomer, for the
Rules allow for questionable behavior from a moral outlook that is de-
fensible only when looked at from the dual viewpoints of the adversarial
process and the perceived need to preserve client confidences. When the
Model Rules were drafted, the ABA specifically rejected requiring truth
in negotiations.2 8 The preamble contained hortatory language which was
adopted:
"As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client
but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others."
26 Mansfield, Compliance with 1983 Changes In Rules of Civil Procedure, 190
N.Y.L.J. 1 (1983). Also see: Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure §1331 History ofRule 11 (1990).
27 Wright and Miller, id.
28 The history of the Model Rules is found in "The Legislative History of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates,"
published by the Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association,
1987.
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In the Rules themselves, however, there is no requirement of honest
dealing. As finally adopted, the Rules reflect a tension between maintain-
ing the attorney-client privilege and determining under what circum-
stances an attorney can reveal otherwise privileged communications.
Rule 1.6, as proposed, required an attorney to reveal communications the
lawyer reasonably believed necessary:
"To prevent the client from committing a . . . fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . .. substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another."
As proposed, privileged information was not a bar; an attorney was
required to speak out to prevent substantial financial injury to another
even if this meant the client would get less. This rule, as proposed, en-
shrined the concept of a fair deal. This language was deleted, however
because of the fear that the proposed Rule would transform a lawyer "in-
to a 'policeman' over a client.",29 The language requiring lawyers to act if
the client was going to commit a "fraudulent act" causing substantial in-
jury to the financial interests or property of others disappeared com-
pletely from the final text of Rule 1.6, leading one to the conclusion that
the Bar Association believes it proper for a lawyer to remain silent in the
face of actions that, fraudulent or not, can cause substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another as long as the information is
privileged or confidential. This conclusion, unfortunately, appears valid
because of a corresponding change in proposed Model Rule 4.1. As pro-
posed, Rule 4.1 prevented a lawyer from knowingly making a false
statement of material fact or law and would have required disclosure of
client confidences in furtherance of the Rule. The language requiring
truthfulness, even if it revealed a potential client confidence, however,
was deleted.o
Truthfulness and fair dealing were not the requirements of the Mod-
el Rules. The ABA Comments to the Rules make for interesting reading,
for they specifically allow "puffing," "failing to be truthful about settle-
ment amounts," and other matters as long as they do not constitute
"fraud." 3
29 Discussion, February, 1993 Mid-Year Meeting, Legislative History, p. 48.
3o The revision of Model Rule 4.1, showing the deleted and added language, is as
follows:
"(a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(IA) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(2b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohib-
ited by Rule 1.6,
(b) ThB dii tted in thoi Rue 4.1i entled "Statementso Fct," A ras
k&fcmaiz ether-.ise. p..teeti by Rudle 1.6.'
31 The ABA Official Comment to Rule 4.1 entitled "Statements of Fact," reads:
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The Comment to Rule 1.6 interacted with the Comments to Rule
4.1; truth is not the objective. In negotiations, a lawyer is entitled (but
never required) to reveal client confidences if making a disclosure "fa-
cilitates a satisfactory solution." Facilitation of a satisfactory solution is
not necessarily one that is equitable to both sides. There is no require-
ment of revealing a confidence in order to reveal the truth. The Rule con-
tains a clear demarcation; conduct that is "fraudulent" is forbidden, but
all else is merely part of negotiating strategy.
In light of these two rules, other language of the Code, such as that
in Rule 2.1 allowing (but not mandating) lawyers to consider moral is-
sues, may tend to ring somewhat hollow. 2
These rules, which relate to negotiation, are sharply contrasted by
the rules regulating conduct before a tribunal. While the language of
3.3(a)(1) and 4.1(a) is identical in that a lawyer "shall not knowingly
make a false statement of material fact or law, .. ." there was an attempt
made to subordinate the lawyer's duty of candor to the court to the rules
relating to privilege. The amendments were defeated because as the dis-
cussion notes, "the duty of candor toward the court was regarded as pa-
ramount." Legislative History, p. 122. (emphasis supplied). The ABA
Comment to Rule 4.1 specifically allows statements about "a party's in-
tention as to an acceptable settlement of a claim" to be exempted from
the rule prohibiting false statements of "material fact"; apparently you
can lie with impunity about your settlement authority. There is, however,
no such exemption in the comments to Rule 3.1 concerning candor to the
tribunal, and probably for good reason. A lawyer who, during a settle-
ment conference with a judge, misstates the client's intention as to an
acceptable settlement undoubtedly acts at his or her peril. While there is
a special rule (3.4) relating to "fairness to opposing party and counsel," it
seems solely directed at trial procedure.
The limited rules relating to negotiations, as opposed to the broader
and more detailed rules relating to litigation, have been the subject of
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be re-
garded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction and a party's intention as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in
this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where non-
disclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
32 Rule 2.1 provides:
Rule 2.1 and Comment as Adopted
Rule 2.1 Advisor
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation. (emphasis supplied).
120-
13
Rubin: Why Worry About Professionalism?
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2009
much commentary. In her famous Law Review Article, "Bargaining and
the Ethics of Process," Professor Norton noted:
The Model Rules do not exempt negotiation from ethical con-
straints, but neither are the rules drafted to address the demands of
bargaining with the same specificity that they address the demands
of litigation. No rule or law requires fairness during negotiation ...
* * * [In] negotiation, where there is only the sparsest written guid-
ance, the parties must decide for themselves what is legal, what is
factual, and what is ethical.
Professor Bok, in her book, Lying, has a similar caveat:
"But codes of ethics function all too often as shields; their abstrac-
tion allows many to adhere to them while continuing their ordinary
practices. In business as well as in those professions that have al-
ready developed codes, much more is needed. The codes must be
but the starting point for a broad inquiry into the ethical quandaries
encountered at work. Lay persons, and especially those affected by
the professional practices, such as customers or patients, must be in-
cluded in these efforts, and must sit on regulatory commissions. Me-
thods of disciplining those who infringe the guidelines must be giv-
en teeth and enforced."34
Courts themselves have not hesitated to state how they feel about
lawyer's comments in pending cases: lawyers are held to high standards,
regardless of the existence of some ABA or Bar-promulgated rule.
* "[A]ttorneys are officers of the court, and " 'when they address
the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declara-
tions are virtually made under oath.'35
* " '[O]nce a lawyer is admitted to the bar, although he does not
surrender his freedom of expression, he must temper his criti-
cisms in accordance with professional standards of conduct."36
7. The Ethics 2000 Debate
The new ABA Model Rules ("E2K") started out to make changes in
this outcome. Previous to its proposal, a number of states had rejected the
ABA Model Rules restrictions in favor of a more disclosure-oriented
" Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.Rev.
493, 529 (1989).
34 Bok, Lying.
3 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978), quoting with approval from State
v. Brazile, 75 So.2d 856 (La. 1954).
36 Travelers Insurance Company v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1409
(5"' Cir. 1994), quoting from U.S. District Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 866 (9' Cir.
1993).
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approach. The Ethics 2000 Advisory Committee looked at and approved
of these approaches.
The ABA House of Delegates3 7 approved a change in the Model
Rules to allow (but not compel) a lawyer to disclose information that
may result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily injury. On the
other hand, by a 63% vote, the House defeated the Ethics 2000 proposal
to allow an attorney to reveal crimes or frauds that are reasonably certain
to result in substantial financial injury in the limited case where the client
is using or has used the attorney's services in furtherance of the fraud. In
light of this action, the Ethics 2000 committee withdrew a related pro-
posal. The text of the proposal and the House of Delegate's actions,
showing additions and deletions to the previous rule, and deletions from
the text of the ABA's E2K Committee's new proposed rule, is set forth
below:
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in or the disclosure is Permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
[4mendment to reject the Ethics 2000 version and go back to previ-
ous version rejected by a vote of213 to 207]
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm; or
[Amendment to delete this provision entirely passed by 63%]
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime orfraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial in-
terests or properU qf another and in furtherance qf which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services:
[The next provision was withdrawn in light ofdeletion of 1.6(b)2.]
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in fur-
therance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
[These provisions passed]
" The ABA House of Delegates approved the change in this rule in August 2001 and
approved the entire reworked Rules in the mid-year 2002 meeting.
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(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with
these Rules,
(2)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client or
(6 to comply with other law or a court order.
8. Most Basic Negotiation: Your Own Job
There are remarkably few cases about attorneys negotiating about
their own jobs. Two of the most important, however, were decided by the
U.S. Fifth Circuit.
Douglas v. DynMcDermot?8 involved an African-American female
lawyer, an in-house counsel, who was concerned about discrimination
against her. A good synopsis of the case appears in Kaible v. U.S. Com-
puter Group, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 373 (E.D. N.Y. 1998), which described
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the plaintiffs claim as a "stinging opin-
ion."
"In June 1994, general counsel asked the plaintiff to attend a meet-
ing with DOE auditors on compliance with the contract's anti-bias re-
quirements. In response to a query about EEOC complaints from em-
ployees, the plaintiff said the situation was "a class action waiting to
happen." She also said one worker, who she named, was dissatisfied
with the resolution of her complaint. Displeased with her statements,
general counsel criticized her for poor judgment at the meeting in a writ-
ten performance evaluation two weeks later. The plaintiff responded
with a five page letter, copied to a DOE whistle-blower officer, com-
plaining that she had suffered racial and sexual discrimination. The
plaintiffs letter also discussed the dissatisfied co-worker's case.
DynMcDermott fired the plaintiff, claiming she breached client confi-
dences by sending her letter to outside parties. The plaintiff sued, alleg-
ing in part that she was terminated in retaliation for reporting discrimina-
tion. A federal jury agreed." The plaintiff, when asked at the time, said
that the DOE whistle-blower officer should not treat her letter as a whis-
tle-blower complaint.
The problem was not that the plaintiff may not have had a valid Ti-
tle VII claim or even that her letter may not have constituted opposition
to employment discrimination. Rather, the attorney's obligation to main-
tain client confidences trumps even the certain Title VII rights. The two
rights must be balanced, and the client's right of confidentiality can
- 123 -
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trump Title VII rights of the in-house attorney. As the DynMcDermott
cour3 9 stated, "although she surely did not surrender her Title VII rights
when she signed on with DynMcDermott as in-house counsel.. . she did
in fact assume professional responsibilities that constrained her exercise
of those rights." 144 F.3d 376. Therefore, ethical breaches were unpro-
tected under Title VII. The key was that Title VII does not give an in-
house attorney leave to breach client confidences.
The solution to the problem that the attorney in DynMcDermott
faced - how to assert your Title VII rights ethically and professionally -
in fact had been discussed 15 years earlier in Doe v. A. Corporation, 709
F.2d 1043, (5th Cir. 1983). There, an in-house attorney who had resigned
attempted to bring a lawsuit on behalf of himself and a class of employ-
ees about benefits the attorney claimed was due. The Doe court held that
the attorney could not represent the class but could bring the action on
his own behalf. The court noted that while an in-house attorney can bring
a lawsuit to vindicate rights, the client's interest in confidentiality must
be protected; so important was the confidentiality issue that the names of
the parties in the lawsuit were disguised. There was no indication that
confidences were revealed in the mere filing of the petition, and the court
also emphasized that the confidences the anonymous "Doe" had received
could not even be disclosed to another lawyer representing other claim-
ants. "As a member of a profession that enjoys the exclusive license to
engage in the practice of law, he is required to deny requests that would
violate the ethical tenets of his profession even at the sacrifice of self-
interest." 709 F.2d. 1047.
A third interesting case about attorneys and their own employment
is the Chicago case of Krieger v. Adler, Kaplan & Begy.40 A Washington
D.C. attorney, who had been terminated from a D.C. firm, negotiated to
move to Chicago to join a Chicago firm. After two "rocky" years, the
attorney was discharged from the Chicago firm. The lawyer promptly
sued, claiming among other things that he was fraudulently induced to
move to Chicago and take the job. Among the allegations that led to the
fraudulent inducement claim were representations the law firm had made
to him that it was a "reputable, well managed, stable law firm, providing
ethical practice of law and proper staffing, management and supervision
in matters in litigation." The Court held that, even if these statements
were false, there were "puffery" made in the process of recruitment and
cannot qualify as fraudulent misrepresentations because the plaintiff
"could not have justifiably relied on such obvious self-touting." This is
3 For a case that allowed the parties to amend their pleadings concerning whether
confidences were revealed and a discussion of First Amendment rights, see Washington
v. Davis, 2001 WL 1287125, 13 A.D. Cases 1043 (E.D. La. 2001).
40 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1710, 1997 WL 323827 (N.D. 111. 1997)
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because "such puffery is common between a prospective employer and
employee and is a statement of opinion that cannot give rise to fraud."'A
9. Restating Liability: Two ALI Projects
Professionalism concerns not merely a lawyer's relationship with
other lawyers and with the courts, but also with third parties. Two ALI
projects concern lawyer liability to third parties: the Restatement of the
Law Governing LawyerS42 and the Restatement of Torts.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ("ALI Lawyers
Restatement") contains a number of provisions that directly relate to
third party liability. §56 states that a lawyer can be liable to a nonclient
"when a nonlawyer would be [liable] in similar circumstances." The ex-
amples given under §56 include: a fraud claim against a lawyer who
"knowingly helps a client deceive"43; assisting a client commit a tort
through acts which are themselves tortious;" a fraudulent misre resenta-
tion that is something more than "legally innocuous hyperbole"; s as well
as liability under federal securities laws, antitrust statutes, RICO, and
consumer protection laws.
The basis of this liability is the duty of care that lawyers owe to
nonclients under §51 of the ALI Lawyer Restatement." While some have
41 Id., on reconsideration in part, 1997 WL 349988 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
42 ALI Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers (2000).
4 ALI Lawyers Restatement §56, Comment c, p. 417.
4 Id
4s ALl Lawyers Restatement §56, Comment f, p. 418. This comment begins: "Misrep-
resentation is not part of proper legal assistance . . ."
46 §51 of the ALI Lawyer Restatement ("Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients") pro-
vides:
For purposes of liability under § 48, lawyer owes a duty to use care within the
meaning of § 52 in each of the following circumstances:
(1) to a prospective client, as stated in § 15;
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer or (with lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client in-
vites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal
services, and the nonclient so relies; and
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the
lawyer to be entitled to protection;
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objec-
tives of the representation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's perform-
ance of obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obli-
gations to the client unlikely; and
(4) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
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criticized this standard as being too harsh on lawyers, since it does not
look to whether the assistance to the nonclient is the sole (rather than
simply one) of the primary purposes of the lawyer's actions, D. Culver
Smith, III, "Professional Liability of Lawyers in Florida: Theories of Li-
ability," PLLF-FL-CLE 1-1 (2002), commenting on and quoting from
Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice , §7.8 at 697-698 (West Group 5th
ed. 2000). it does attempt to create a fact-specific balancing test while at
the same time apparently allowing lawyers to attempt to limit liability by
contractual language. This has been termed the "contractarian" view of
liability.48
The comments to (but not the black letter of) §51 seem to acknowl-
edge the possibility of contractual limitations on the scope of the duty
and even indicate that the duty is less if there is experienced counsel on
the other side of the table.49 There is no explanation, however, why Law-
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary act-
ing primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient;
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary
with respect to a matter within the scope of the representation to prevent or
rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to the nonclient,
where (i) the breach is a crime or fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is as-
sisting the breach;
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of the
lawyer's obligations to the client.
4 "One commentator characterizes the Restatement approach as 'unique and ques-
tionable':
" 'The "primary objectives" inquiry is not the same as the judicially developed, in-
tended-beneficiary standard. The focus of the common law is whether that noncli-
ent is the intended beneficiary of the lawyer's retention; whereas the Restatement
asks only if a benefit is "one of the primary objectives." Unlike the common-law
principle, the Restatement does not look to the primary purpose, but only for one of
several primary purposes. This deviation from the case law raises factual issues re-
garding the client's motives. Further, the multiple objectives could be inconsistent,
so that claimant's perceptions of the lawyer's obligations could be in conflict with
the client's objectives. The risk of conflicting interests is minimized, if not elimi-
nated, by "the intended beneficiary" standard.' "
4 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, "Rules Lawyers Play By," 76 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 665,
696 (2001).
4 §51, Comment (e), provides in part (emphasis supplied):
A lawyer may avoid liability to nonclients under Subsection (2) by making clear
that an opinion or representation is directed only to a client and should not be relied
on by others. Likewise, a lawyer may limit or avoid liability under Subsection (2)
by qualifying a representation, for example by making clear through limiting or
disclaiming language in an opinion letter that the lawyer is relying on facts pro-
vided by the client without independent investigation by the lawyer (assuming that
the lawyer does not know the facts provided by the client to be false, in which case
the lawyer would be liable for misrepresentation). The effectiveness of a limitation
or disclaimer depends on whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to con-
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yer X's duties to a nonclient should diminish solely because of the pres-
ence or absence of Lawyer Y on the opposite end of the table, apparently
leaving one with the possibilities that either (a) experienced counsel Y
shouldn't or wouldn't let Lawyer X get away with something bad, or, if
something bad did happen, then (b) the nonclient should sue its own
counsel Y rather than the other side's Lawyer X. This apparent rationale,
however, could be attacked by the argument that, if something bad did
happen, then it would appear Lawyer Y really wasn't as experienced as
the nonclient anticipated, meaning that Lawyer X's duties to the noncli-
ent shouldn't be diminished.
Unlike the ABA's elevation of confidentiality above the obligation
to prevent financial loss, the ALI Lawyer Restatement §67 allows a law-
yer to disclose confidential information to "prevent, rectify, or miti-
gate"50 a "substantial financial loss"51 to a third person caused by a client
crime or fraud even if the "loss has not yet occurred,"S2 but this can occur
only if the "client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in
the matter in which the . . . fraud is committed." Even if these criteria
are met, §67 cautions that the attorney must first make a "good faith ef-
fort to persuade the client not to act" 54 if this is feasible or ask the client
to "warn the victim"55 or fix the problem. §67 closes with the caution
that a lawyer who either acts or fails to act under its principles is not
"solely by reason of such action or inaction"56 liable in damages -- ap-
parently it takes action or inaction plus something else.
There are four Illustrations to §67 that are pertinent to non-litigation
negotiations. These Illustrations, unlike the E2K Model Rules 1.6 and
clude that those provided with the opinion would receive the limitation or dis-
claimer and understand its import. The relevant circumstances include customary
practices known to the recipient concerning the construction of opinions and
whether the recipient is represented by counsel or a similarly experienced agent.
0 ALI Lawyer Restatement §67(2).
51 ALI Lawyer Restatement §67(1)(a).
52 ALI Lawyer Restatement §67(1)(b).
5 ALI Lawyer Restatement §67(1)(d).
5 ALI Lawyer Restatement §67(3).
ss Id.
5 ALl Lawyer Restatement §67(4).
5 These Illustrations are:
3. Client has been charged by a regulatory agency with participation in a
scheme to defraud Victim. Client seeks the assistance of Lawyer in defending
against the charges. The loss to Victim has already occurred. During the initial in-
terview and thereafter, Lawyer is provided with ample reason to believe that Cli-
ent's acts were fraudulent and caused substantial financial loss to Victim. Because
Lawyer's services were not employed by Client in committing the fraud, Lawyer
does not have discretion under this Section to use or disclose Client's confidential
information.
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4.1, recognize that a client cannot have the lawyer perform work that
causes grievous financial losses and then expect the lawyer to remain
silent, notwithstanding any expectations or rules of confidentiality.58
4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the law of the applicable juris-
diction provides that each day during which a wrongdoer in the position of Client
fails to make restitution to Victim constitutes a separate offense of the same type as
the original wrong. Notwithstanding the continuing-offense law, commission of the
fraudulent act of Client has already occurred without use of Lawyer's services. As
in Illustration 3, Lawyer does not have discretion under this Section to use or dis-
close Client's confidential information.
5. Lawyer has assisted Client in preparing documents by means of which Client
will obtain a $5,000,000 loan from Bank. The loan closing occurred on Monday
and Bank will make the funds available for Client's use on Wednesday. On Tues-
day Client reveals to Lawyer for the first time that Client knowingly obtained the
loan by means of a materially false statement of Client's assets. Assuming that the
other conditions for application of Subsection (2) are present, while Client's frau-
dulent act of obtaining the loan has, in large part, already occurred, Lawyer has dis-
cretion under the Subsection to use or disclose Client's confidential information to
prevent the consequences of the fraud (final release of the funds from Bank) from
occurnng.
6. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that Lawyer learned of the fraud on
Wednesday after Bank had already released the funds to Client. Under Subsection
(2), Lawyer's use or disclosure would be permissible if necessary for the purpose,
for example, of enabling Bank to seize assets of Client in its possession or control
as an offset against the fraudulently obtained loan or to prevent Client from sending
the funds overseas and thereby making it difficult or impossible to trace them.
58 The full text of §67 ("Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Miti-
gate Substantial Financial Loss) reads:
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the lawyer
reasonably believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime or
fraud, and:
(a) the crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss;
(b) the loss has not yet occurred;
(c) the lawyer's client intends to commit the crime or fraud either person-
ally or through a third person; and
(d) the client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in the
matter in which the crime or fraud is committed.
(2) If a crime or fraud described in Subsection (1) has already occurred, a lawyer
may use or disclose confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss.
(3) Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the lawyer must, if
feasible, make a good-faith effort to persuade the client not to act. If the client or
another person has already acted, the lawyer must, if feasible, advise the client to
warn the victim or to take other action to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss. The
lawyer must, if feasible, also advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use or dis-
close information as provided in this Section and the consequences thereof.
(4) A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this
Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to professional
discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred
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While §67 states in a comment (but not in the black letter text) that
these exceptions to confidentiality are "extraordinary," it is clear that
no longer can lawyers hide behind the Model Rules; courts can and will
be looking to the ALI Lawyer Restatement as another basis to find liabil-
ity.
The second basis used to impart nonclient liability to lawyers is
§552 of the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts,60 which concerns justifi-
able reliance on the advice of a professional. §552 has been used by
courts in addressing lawyers liability to those other than their clients.6'
10. A CuriouE Paradox
All of this leads to a curious paradox. Under the ALI Lawyer Re-
statement, "a lawyer re resenting a party in litigation has no duty of care
to the opposing party, but representations in opinions and certain other
matters can be actionable,63 and it cannot be unexpected that representa-
tions in negotiations themselves may become actionable." On the other
from recovery against a client or third person.
59 ALl Lawyer Restatement §67, Comment (b), p. 506.
60 Torts Restatement §552 reads, in part:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecu-
niary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is lim-
ited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient in-
tends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
61 See, e.g., First National Bank of Durant v. Trans Terra Corporation International,
142 F.3d 802 (5d Cir. 1999); McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Inter-
ests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (S.Ct. Tex. 1999).
62 ALI Lawyer Restatement §51, Comment c, p. 358.
63 ALI Lawyer Restatement §51(2)(a) deals with reliance upon a lawyer's "opinion or
provision of other legal services" relied upon by the nonclient; §52(3) involves a lawyer's
services that, with the client's knowledge, benefit the nonclient; and §52(4) concerns a
lawyer taking appropriate action involving a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the client
to the nonclient involving fraud.
6 ALl Restatement §67 concerning when a lawyer is allowed to breach confidential-
ity to prevent a fraud that "threatens substantial financial loss." Although none of the
Illustrations deal with negotiations, the black letter text does not exclude negotiations
from its scope. For more on issues involving negotiations and the ABA rules, see: M.
Rubin, "The Ethics of Negotiations: Are There Any?" 56 Louisiana Law Review 447
(1995).
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hand, under E2K Model Rule 4.1, misrepresentations in negotiations are
not a basis of liability if the misrepresentations concern negotiating posi-
tion or even, apparently, on the value of the item about which negotia-
tions are occurring, for these are not "material facts" under the comments
to Rule 4.1. Thus, is one to gather from all this that an attorney appar-
ently can be less truthful in a litigation arena than in a negotiation? This
runs directly counter to the ABA's Model Rules, which place far greater
scrutiny on an attorney's representations in tribunal settings than in nego-
tiations. 5
11. Ethics, Professionalism, and Tactics during Negotiation
Applying concepts of "ethics" and "professionalism" is not a matter
merely of litigation tactics, where "hard-ball" antics are a matter of re-
cord, either in depositions or in trial. The daily process of negotiations in
which each every lawyer is engaged needs to be considered.
Discussions of what is and is not "ethical" during negotiations have
consumed reams of paper with law review articles containing, in the ag-
gregate, thousands of footnotes. On the one side is the view that there are
two precepts which should guide the lawyer's conduct in negotiations:
honesty and good faith; and that a lawyer may not accept a result that is
unconscionably unfair to the other party.66 At the other end of the spec-
trum are those who argue that obtaining the best interest of the client is
the proper overall goal and should be pursued vigorously in the absence
of outright fraud. Discussions of this view can be found in the writings of
Professors James J. White 7 and Charles Curtis. The tension, at base, is
not necessarily between "ethics" as an abstract notion, but rather whether
various negotiation tactics are permitted or prohibited by the Model
Rules.
The high regard with which negotiating tactics are viewed by some
can be seen in titles to law review articles such as:
* "The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations"; 69
* "Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dis-
honest: How To be Assertive Without Being Offensive"; 70
65 Id. Compare E2K Model Rule 3.3 (dealing with candor to the court in tribunal set-
tings) to E2K Model Rule 4 (dealing with third parties).
6 What Professor Norton (p. 513) has termed the "universal" position is exemplified
and was first expounded in a 1975 law review article by Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 35
La.L.Rev. 577, 589, A Causerie on Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation.
67 White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980
Am. B. Found. RES.J. 926.
6 Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stanford L.Rev. 3 (1951). Professor Norton calls
Professor Curtis's view "stark traditionalism," Norton at p. 513.
69 Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in Negotiations, 76 Iowa L.Rev. 1219 (1990).
70 Craver, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 713 (1997)
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* "Professionalism: Lip Service or Life Style";7
* "Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations" ;72
and
* "Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer
Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?"73
Many of these articles contain a search for principles that should
guide attorneys during negotiations. The fact that the authors of these
articles have felt a need to develop criteria and to articulate them is in-
dicative of the fact that the Model Code and the Model Rules are defi-
cient in this regard.
The tension is between being an effective negotiator and being
truthful and has been noted succinctly and clearly by Professor Wet-
laufer:
Effectiveness in negotiations is central to the business of lawyering
and a willingness to lie is central to one's effectiveness in negotia-
tions. Within a wide range of circumstances, well-told lies are high-
ly effective. Moreover, the temptation to lie is great not just because
lies are effective, but also because the world in which most of us
live is one that honors instrumental effectiveness above all other
things. Most lawyers are paid not for their virtues but for the results
they produce. Our clients, our partners and employees, and our fam-
ilies are all counting on us to deliver the goods. Accordingly and re-
grettably, lying is not the province of a few 'unethical lawyers' who
operate on the margins of the profession. It is a permanent feature of
advocacy and thus of almost the entire province of law.
Our discomfort with that fact has, I believe, led us to create and em-
brace a discourse on the ethics of lying that is uncritical, self-
justificatory and largely unpersuasive. Our motives in this seem rea-
sonably clear. Put simply, we seek the best of both worlds. On the
one hand, we would capture as much of the available surplus as we
can. In doing so, we enrich our clients and ourselves. Further, we
gain for ourselves a reputation for personal power and instrumental
effectiveness. And we earn the right to say we can never be conned.
At the same time, on the other hand, we assert our claims to a repu-
tation for integrity and personal virtue, to the high status of a profes-
sion, and to the legitimacy of the system within which we live and
71 Sowle, Professionalism: Lip Service or Life Style, 59 Jan. Or. St. B. Bull. 33
(1999).
7 Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 Review of Litiga-
tion, 173 (1979).
7 Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer Professional-
ism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better, 87 Ky. L. J. 1019 (1999).
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work. Even Gorgias, for all his power of rhetoric, could not con-
74vincingly assert both of these claims. Nor can we....
12. The Not So Subtle Art of Misdirection
Whether the articulated standard is that lawyers "must use any le-
gally available move or procedure helpful to a client's bargaining posi-
tion,"5 an "almost pathological pro-client attitude," or "'total annihila-
tion' of the other side,"" or other, less pejorative phrases, "effective" ne-
gotiation often means winning big, and this often involves, to use a kind
euphemism, "misdirection." "Misdirection" can include either a true but
incomplete statement of facts or silence, both of which are designed to
lead the other party to an erroneous conclusion about the facts or your
true position. The excuse for this behavior ("I didn't lie"), according to
Professor Wetlaufer, can be categorized as follows:
"[L]awyers sometimes assert that whatever they did was not a lie.
These claims are of at least five kinds: (1) 'I didn't lie because I did-
n't engage in the requisite act or omission'; (2) 'I didn't mean to do
anything that can be described as lying'; (3) 'I didn't lie because
what I said was, in some way, literally true'; (4) 'I can't have lied
because I was speaking on some subject about which there is no
'truth'; and (5) 'I didn't lie, I merely put matters in their best
light.'"n7
Other categories where a "lie" or "mistruth" has been stated, accord-
ing to Wetlaufer, fall into the following groups:
1. I lied, if you insist on calling it that, but it was an omission of a
kind that is presumed to be ethically permissible.
2. I lied but it was legal.
3. I lied but it was on an ethically permissible subject.
4. I lied but it had little or no effect.
5. I lied but it was justified by the nature of the negotiations.
6. Lying is within the rules of the game.
7. I lied but it was justified by my relationship to the victim.
As Professor Wetlaufer has written:
". . . A lie about a negotiator's authority is told with the same pur-
pose and with the same effect as a lie about the true mileage of a
used car. The speaker's hope is that, by creating some belief at vari-
74 Wetlaufer, Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L.Rev. at 1272.
Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer
Dispute Bargaining Role, 51:1 Maryland L.Rev. 1, 71.
76 Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition ofLawyering, 19 Hofstra L.Rev. 311, 330.
7 Lawry, Central Moral Tradition at 331.
78 Wetlaufer, Lying in Negotiations at 1237.
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ance with her own, she will get a better deal than she could have
gotten without having created that belief. The advantages she may
hope to secure through these lies are every bit as tangible, every bit
as great, and every bit as illegitimate as those she might hope to se-
cure through lies on other subjects. So is the damage that will be
caused." Wetlaufer, Lying in Negotiations at 1242, 1243.
Whether one calls it "misdirection," "puffing," "bluffing," or some
other term, one need not resort to biblical injunctions to find a discussion
of whether absolute truthfulness is always desirable.79 Thus, the Talmud
admonishes one to refrain from all varieties of dealings which depend
upon obtaining a false value for things, or placing a false value on things.
More importantly, one should not take advantage of the weakness of an-
other, either by raising false hopes or by making tactless remarks. The
Greeks and Romans wrote much on this subject.
Homer wrote, in the Iliad, "For hateful in my eyes, even as the gates
of Hades, is that man who hides one thing in his mind but says an-
other."'o
Aeschylus had Prometheus sa : "The worst disease of all, I say, is
fabricated speeches and disguise.'
Cicero, in his letters to his son, describes a system of moral recti-
tude:
"But the most luxuriantly fertile field of all is that of our moral obli-
gations - since, if we clearly understand these, we have mastered the
rules for leading a good and consistent life.
7 The Talmud, a 20-volume rabbinic exegesis on the Torah (the first five books of
the Bible) dating from the third century, contains numerous comments and explanations
of biblical language. Note: All the quotations and materials in this footnote are from
Studies in Shemot, Book 2, by Nehama Leibowitz.
The Bible contains a rule of fair dealing in pricing. Leviticus 25:1-17 deals with the
concept of the Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee Year. Every seventh year the soil was to
be untilled (the Sabbatical Year). Every 50th year the land was to lie fallow and all
landed property was to revert to the original owners. During 49 of the years the land
could be leased or sold, but during the 50th year it returned to the original owner. Obvi-
ously, the closer one got to the Jubilee Year, the less valuable the rights of the posses-
sor/buyer/lessee. Likewise, the further from the Jubilee Year, the more the owner could
get for the land. Leviticus 25:14-17 specifically requires that the price reflect the fair
value of the land in relation to the Jubilee Year. As Leibowitz notes:
[T]he Torah is not concerned with exclusively protecting the interests of the pur-
chaser to save him from exploitation, or those of the vendor, who has been forced
by his straitened circumstances to sell his ancestral field. But both parties are equal-
ly admonished to abide by the principles of justice and honesty, which alone should
reign in the world and which should not be crowded out by man's selfish greed.
s Iliad, Chapter 9.
I Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, Translation by Paul Roche, Mentor Classics (1962-
1964).
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The most thorough analysis of moral obligations is unquestionably
that of Panaetius, and on the whole, with certain modifications, I
have followed him. The questions relating to this topic which arouse
most discussion and inquiry are classified by Panaetius under three
headings:
1. Is a thing morally right or wrong?
2. Is it advantageous or disadvantageous?
3. If apparent right and apparent advantage clash, what is to
be the basis for our choice between them?
So let us regard this as settled: what is morally wrong can never be
advantageous, even when it enables you to make some gain that you
believe to be to your advantage. The mere act of believing that some
wrongful course of action constitutes an advantage is pericious."42
Cicero wrote about situations involving hard bargaining in business
and sharp practices in the law. Among Cicero's examples was that of a
merchant from Alexandria who brought a large stock of corn to Rhodes,
which was in the midst of a famine. The merchant was aware that other
traders were on their way from Alexandria with substantial cargoes of
grain. The dilemma for the merchant farmer was whether he should tell
the Rhodians this and get a lesser price, or say nothing and get a higher
price. Cicero also posits the example of an honest man who wants to sell
a house knowing that it contains certain defects of which he alone is
aware. Should the seller reveal the defects and perhaps not sell the house
at all or for a lesser price, or should he conceal them?
Cicero points out, using Antipater and Diogenes as two poles of the
argument, that one position is to take a moral view and reveal everything
while the other is that one should do only what is commercially advanta-
geous. Cicero's own view is that one should not conceal any defects:
I believe, then, that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed
the facts from the Rhodians; and the man who was selling the house
should not have withheld its defects from the purchaser. Holding
things back does not always amount to concealment; but it does
when you want people, for your own profit, to be kept in the dark
about something which you know would be useful for them to
know. Anyone can see the sort of concealment that this amounts to -
and the sort of person who practices it. He is the reverse of open,
straight forward, fair and honest: he is a shifty, deep, artful, treach-
erous, malevolent, underhand, sly, habitual rogue. Surely one does
82 Cicero, Selected Works, Translated by Michael Grant, Penguin Books, Copyright
(1960), page 177.
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not derive advantage from earning all those names and many more
besides.83
Cicero traces the requirement of honesty and fair dealings to the
Twelve Tables, the earliest and most fundamental of Roman laws, circa
450 B.C., and to the Plaetorian law, circa 192 B.C. Pointing out that hon-
esty and fair dealing are appropriate criteria, Cicero notes that "the laws
in our Civil Code relating to real property stipulate that in a sale any de-
fects known to the seller have to be declared." A suppression of facts not
asked about was impeunissible. Cicero writes that although the civil law
does not rectify all moral wrongs, there is nobility in the following for-
mulas:
"That I not be deceived and defrauded because of you and because
of trust in you. And that other golden phrase: between honest men
there must be honest dealing and no deception."4
Cicero then discusses what is honest dealing. This Roman view of
the law was adopted by the French in their Civil Code. Robert Pothier,
the great French jurist, stated:
"Good faith obliges the seller not only to refrain from suppressing
the intrinsic faults of what he sells, but universally from concealing
anything concerning it, which might possibly induce the buyer not
to buy it all, or not to buy at so high a price."85
Although civilian jurisdictions (such as Louisiana) have long since
honored truth in negotiations, even enshrining these concepts in their
Civil Codes, the common law took the opposite approach, postulating the
rule of caveat emptor as opposed to the civilian concept of caveat vendi-
tor.86
In Laidlaw v. Organ, a famous common law case, Chief Justice
Marshall rejected the concept of honesty and fair dealings when facts are
83 Cicero, Selected Works, Grant Translation, at 178-179.
8 Cicero, Selected Works, Grant Translation, at 185.
as R. Pothier, Traite Du Contrait de Vente, 2 OEUBRES de Pothier 106 (M.Dupin.
Ed. 1823), translated by Professor Shael Herman in "The Louisiana Civil Code, A Euro-
pean Legacy for the United States," Louisiana Bar Foundation (1993) at 42.
86 Common law precepts are not subject to universal approbation. Litigators who had
the distinction of arguing a case before the late, esteemed Judge John Minor Wisdom of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and who have attempted to wax
eloquent about the majesty of the Anglo-Saxon common law, sometimes elicited a quick
response from Judge Wisdom. He liked to paraphrase Disraeli's famous statement to
Parliament. Judge Wisdom was wont to look down at counsel from the Bench and pro-
claim:
Counselor, when the Angles and Saxons were howling savages, painted blue and
eking out an existence fishing on the fens of England, there was a civil law system
of justice for more than 1,000 years on the Continent of Europe from which Louisi-
ana derived its Civil Code.
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"equally accessible to both parties."8 The buyer, Organ, sought to com-
pel delivery of tobacco that he had purchased. Laidlaw, the seller,
claimed that he was deceived by Organ and did not have to deliver the
tobacco. Laidlaw had asked whether Organ knew of anything that might
affect the tobacco's value and Organ said nothing. In fact, Organ knew
that the price of tobacco had risen steeply because the Treaty of Ghent
had been signed, ending the War of 1812. Organ, the buyer, won because
there was no obligation, said Justice Marshall, to speak. Remaining silent
was permissible," even though Organ knew that Laidlaw was under a
misapprehension.
It is this type of outcome, where sharp bargaining on behalf of one
party obtains an advantage that would not otherwise be there but for the
silence or for the misdirection, that leads to "the sense of injustice."
Professor Edmond Cahn's famous book by this title argues for a philoso-
phy that restores a sense of justice and avoids a sense of injustice in the
law.
"Nevertheless, philosophers have long held the opposing opinion:
that justice or righteousness is the source, the substance, and the ul-
timate end of law. Such a doctrine was announced at least as early
as the Book of Leviticus and the masterpieces of the Athenian en-
lightenment. It developed under the influence of the Stoics through
the centuries of decadence in the Roman republic and early empire,
assumed a pseudo-Christian guise by the time of Justinian's Corpus
Juris, flourished amid the brutalities of medieval Europe, and be-
came, in the skillful hands of Thomas Aquinas, an authentic tenet of
theology."91
13. Non-Litigation Negotiations and Liability to Third Parties
Although the vast bulk of negotiations take place outside of a litiga-
tion context, the rules (if any) that regulate negotiations are determined
primarily by judicial decisions that, of necessity, occur after litigation.
There are few reported ABA advisory opinions on the ethics of non-
litigation negotiations.92 The American Law Institute has completed the
87 Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 178, 179 (1817).
a In fact, the brief of the buyer contended: "The maxim of caveat emptor could never
have crept into the law if the province of ethics had been co-extensive with it." 2 Wheat
at 193.
* For a critique of this view, see Professor Shael Herman's discussion in "The Lou-
isiana Civil Code, A European Legacy for the United States," (Louisiana Bar Foundation
1993) at 42-43.
" Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, Indiana University Press (1964), Midland Book Edi-
tion.
91 Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, Indiana University Press (1964), Midland Book Edi-
tion.
92 See ABA Inf. Opinion 86-1518 (1986). For a state opinion, see N.Y. County Law-
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Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement goes beyond
the Model Code and the Model Rules in some respects and allows for
discipline in negotiations even though the conduct may not be civilly
actionable. "Puffing" would still be allowed in some instances. The Re-
statement addresses issues the ABA Code and Rules do not, and if ap-
plied by courts will substantially narrow the gap between permissible
tactics in general negotiations and those not allowed in the litigation con-
text. The ABA's "Ethics 2000" effort also attempts to confront this is-
sue.93
When it comes time for a court to rule on the limits of ethical be-
havior of lawyers, the court's view often may be colored by the separate
statutory and jurisprudentially evolved standards that control an attor-
ney's duty to the court and to the judge. In making such rulings, however,
seldom do courts explicitly discuss the differences between the profes-
sional rules that relate to negotiations as opposed to court-related princi-
ples.
Analogies to the need to have truthful, fair dealing can be found in
securities litigation. There, a separate body of law regulates what are
"material facts" and "material omissions." Professionals can be "aiders
and abettors" in securities fraud cases.
Even in the securities field, where the liability is statutory, courts
have differing views on whether obligations to the public outweigh obli-
gations to clients or to a corporation. A famous example is the Dirks
case.94 The federal court of appeals had held that Dirks, a respected fi-
nancial analyst, was properly disciplined for failing to disclose to both
the S.E.C. and the public information concerning a company's creation of
false policies and records. The fact that the financial analyst attempted to
get the Wall Street Journal to publish a story about the issue did not
cleanse the failure to disclose the information to the S.E.C. or the pub-
lic.95 Reversing the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court held that
yers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics Op. No. 686 (1991) on the responsi-
bilities of a lawyer who discovers that his client may have given materially inaccurate
information to the other side; cited in Tentative ALI Draft #9, Restatement of Law Gov-
erning Lawyers.
9 More on the ABA's efforts can be found at http://www.abanet.org/cpr
/ethics2k.html. A copy of the ABA's March 23, 1999 draft is attached as an appendix to
this article.
94 Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir. 1982), re-
versed sub nom. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983).
9s Dirks also acted knowingly when he passed on his information to clients before
going to the SEC, in violation of his duty to the public and the SEC and in violation of his
informants' disclose-or-refrain obligations. Therefore, it is not precisely relevant whether
Dirks subjectively "knew" that his clients would trade. He knowingly took improper
actions and put parties who were reasonably likely to trade without disclosure in a posi-
tion to do so.
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Dirks (as a tippee of a tippee) had no duty to disclose. Because there was
no breach of duty to shareholders by insiders, "there was no derivative
breach by Dirks."96 The dissent would have found Dirks liable, claiming
that an inquiry into motives was not necessary.9 7 Although the motives
may have been "laudable, the means he chose were not. * * * As a citi-
zen, Dirks had at least an ethical obligation to report the information to
the proper authorities."98 If the courts have difficulty in delineating ethi-
cal duties in the highly regulated securities field, then it is not unusual
that the regulation of ethics in general negotiations is said by some to be
even more troublesome.
One commentator has even asserted that lawyers can "misrepresent"
some issues with impunity:
"Almost all negotiators expect opponents to engage in "puffing" and
"embellishment." Advocates who hope to obtain $50,000 settle-
ments may initially insist upon $150,000 or even $200,000. They
may also embellish the pain experienced by their client, so long as
their exaggerations do not transcend the bounds of expected propri-
ety. * * *
"It is thus ethical for legal negotiators to misrepresent the value
their client places on particular items. For example, attorneys repre-
senting one spouse involved in a marital dissolution may indicate
that their client wants joint custody of the children, when in reality
he or she does not. Lawyers representing a party attempting to pur-
chase a particular company may understate their client's belief re-
garding the value of the goodwill associated with the target firm. So
long as the statement conveys their side's belief - and does not
falsely indicate the view of an outside expert, such as an accountant
- no Rule 4.1 violation would occur.
Legal negotiators may also misrepresent client settlement inten-
tions. They may ethically suggest to opposing counsel that an out-
standing offer is unacceptable, even though they know the proposed
terms would be accepted if no additional concessions could be gen-
erated." 9
The record thus amply supports the SEC's finding that Dirks acted with requisite scienter
for aiding or abetting liability under Rule 1Ob-5. 681 F.2d at 846.
96 463 U.S. at 667. 103 S.Ct. at 3268.
9 Dissent of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 463 U.S. at
674, 103 S.Ct. at 3271.
9 Emphasis supplied; 463 U.S. at 678, 103 S.Ct. at 3273.
9 Craver, "Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest: How
To be Assertive Without Being Offensive," 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 713, 726 (1997).
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There are cases that deal with negotiations in non-litigation transac-
tions. Most involve alleged fraud by a seller or lender and the lawyer's
liability, particularly if there was but one lawyer handling all aspects of
the closing for the lender, buyer, and seller.1" These cases usually in-
volve claims of self-dealing or mixed representation.
In New Jersey, Baldasarre v. Butler'0' has provided a cautionary
note for all attorneys who attempt to represent both buyer and seller.
There, even though the attorney attempted to obtain written consents
from both the buyer and seller, the attorney found himself in an unten-
able conflict when the buyer attempted to "flip" the property to a third
party while continuing to negotiate for extensions on the closing with the
seller. What is intriguing about the case, however, is not only the con-
flict-of-interest issue, but also an unspoken issue - consider what would
have happened had the attorney represented only the buyer. As the Court
noted, the problem in the case was the dual representation by the attor-
ney; the Court found no duty by the buyer to inform the seller that the
buyer was going to obtain a great profit by executing an assignment or
sale of his rights once the sale with the seller was closed. In fact, the
Court found that the buyer "had no duty to disclose" 02 his intended use
or profit - in other words, the buyer could deceive the seller and refuse to
give truthful information. Thus, theoretically, an independent attorney
for the buyer would likewise have been under no compunction to reveal
the potential "flip" of the property and would not have violated the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct in remaining silent, even had the
purchaser asked about the buyer's intended use of the property. Indeed,
the Court explicitly noted that the buyer's silence was perfectly permis-
sible and that the buyer "did no wrong." 0 3
Contrast Baldasarre v. Butler with Petrillo v. Bachenberg,' where
there was alleged negligent misrepresentation by a seller's attorney in-
volving percolation tests on the property. While Baldasarre held a law-
yer culpable because of a conflict of interest involving two clients on
opposite sides of a deal, Petrillo determined that the attorney could be
liable to a non-client in the furnishing of a percolation test report that
was not "complete and accurate" but rather was apparently a composite
of two different reports. Notwithstanding the broad rule of Petrillo, New
Jersey has refused to make a violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct "a basis for civil liability against an adversary's attorney." Baxt v.
10 See, Louisiana State Bar Association v. Klein, 538 So.2d 559 (La. 1989).
1o 132 N.J. 278, 625 A.2d 458 (1993).
102 Id., 625 A.2d at 464.
103 Id.
1 263 N.J.Super. 472, 483, 623 A.2d 272 (App.Div.1993) (same), aff'd, 139 N.J. 472,
655 A.2d 1354 (1995).
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Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 197; 714 A.2d 271, 274 (1998).0 Of course, this
does not mean that a violation of the ALI Restatement might not lead to
liability.
'os The Court in Baxt stated (155 N.J. 206 et seq., 714 A.2d 279 et seq.):
The record before this Court presents an object lesson in unprofessional behavior
by experienced and knowledgeable trial lawyers. For a period spanning the course
of at least one month, between November and December 1991, defendants Liloia
and Sylvester knowingly and deliberately obstructed the discovery process in the
Summit foreclosure action by misleading plaintiffs about the source of the signed
modification agreement and by refusing to respond candidly to specific requests for
direct and accurate information. The sequence of events during which this behavior
took place can be briefly described.
In June 1991, the bank produced its credit file for Grove's inspection. At that time
the file contained one copy of the modification agreement signed only by bank of-
ficer Jennifer Calenda. From July 31 to August 1, 1991, Grove in turn produced
documents for the bank's inspection, wherein defendants found and copied an orig-
inal modification agreement signed by Paul Hartman and witnessed, notarized and
signed by Calenda. Subsequently, on September 27, 1991, Summit filed a motion
for summary judgment, attaching in support a copy of the executed modification
agreement obtained through discovery. Grove opposed Summit's motion and filed
a cross-motion to compel depositions, which was granted.
Grove's attorney, by letter dated November 27, 1991, requested that defendants
make the "bank's original credit file" available for her use during her scheduled
depositions. Presumably this request was not honored at the November 30, 1991
deposition of Scott Witherspoon, a former bank officer, as Grove's attorney re-
newed her request by letter dated December 1, 1991. Prior to the next scheduled
deposition, defendant Liloia instructed Calenda to insert the copy of the agreement
signed by Hartman and found in Grove's files into the bank's credit file.
At the December 4, 1991 deposition of Calenda, Grove's attorney attempted to find
out whether the bank had ever received an original copy of the modification agree-
ment signed by Paul Hartman. Defendants Liloia and Sylvester promised to inves-
tigate whether the bank had received an original or a facsimile only. During the de-
position, Grove's attorney also repeated her request for access to the bank's origi-
nal files. Although it does not appear that she received the files at the deposition,
defendant Sylvester did indicate by letter dated December 5, 1991 that "the original
files were produced again" for her inspection on December 4.
On December 7, 1991, prior to a second deposition of Witherspoon, Grove's attor-
ney reviewed what Sylvester characterized as "the original bank files" and listed for
the record the documents she found, including the copy of the signed modification
agreement. In the deposition which followed, the attorney repeatedly requested that
defendant Sylvester produce "the document on which [the bank] moved for sum-
mary judgment." Even more specifically, she asked Sylvester if "[tihe copy an-
nexed to the motion for summary judgment[ J was ... taken from the bank's files?"
The following colloquy took place:
Mr. Sylvester I'm not here to answer questions. I don't know. You know,
I'm not going to answer the questions.
Ms. Chaitman: Can you tell me where else it would have been?
Mr. Sylvester: I'm not saying where it was taken from, I'm not here.
Ms. Chaitman: Let me say this. When the documents were produced to us,
there was no Mortgage and Note Modification Agreement produced with any
signatures on it other than Jennifer's and ... I'm wondering if it came out of
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Moreover, note that the Petrillo court seemingly made the attorney
liable not to a specific purchaser but to any purchaser who might rea-
sonably be expected to rely upon the composite report. Petrillo even rec-
ognized (unlike some legal critics) that lawyers are human: ""[i]n many
situations, lawyers, like people generally, may not have a duty to act, but
when they act, like other people, they should act carefully."' Petrillo is
a cautionary tale for real estate lawyers who prepare or assist in the prep-
aration of misleading documents, even if the document does not contain
a traditional "opinion" or even the lawyer's signature on it.
The lack of necessity of expert testimony in certain instances was
approved in RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title In-
surance Company, 58 F.Supp.2d 503, 524 (D. N.J. 1999), for there are
certain matters about a lawyer's liability, wrote the court, which are " 'so
basic' that *a layperson's common knowledge is sufficient to permit a
finding that the duty of care has been breached.""
0 7
14. A Look at Appellate Decisions
While reported Louisiana appellate decisions appear to shy away
from actually sanctioning lawyers for a lack of professionalism rather
than merely calling into question their conduct, federal courts have not
been as reluctant, and there are many reported cases on sanctions.108
Of course, FRCP 11 provides the possibility for sanctions at the dis-
trict court level, as does FRAP 38109 and 46(c)" 0 , while 28 U.S.C. §1927
provides a general policy against those who "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously" multiply litigation. These rules are not the end of the inquiry, for
the Supreme Court has held that courts have inherent powers to sanction
lawyers and clients (including imposition of costs and fees against the
some file other than produced to us....
Mr. Sylvester: Okay. I'll take your request under advisement. Let's proceed.
At this point, if not before, defendants certainly should have disclosed that the mod-
ification agreement on which the bank moved for summary judgment was a copy of
the agreement in the bank's files, having been placed there by the defendants after
they discovered it among Grove's papers. This disclosure was not made. (Emphasis
supplied).
' Id. at 1354.
107 Quoting with approval from Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 670
A.2d 99 (App. Div. 1996).
los See, e.g., the cases cited at footnotes 15-19.
10 "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a sepa-
rately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award
just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." To the same effect, see 28
U.S.C. §1912.
110 "A court of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court rule. First, how-
ever, the court must afford the attorney reasonable notice, an opportunity to show cause
to. the contrary, and, if requested, a hearing."
- 141 -
34
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 56 [2009], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol56/iss1/11
clients, and disbarment against lawyers) even for actions that do not vio-
late the rules or statutes.11 The rules, however, are a good place to begin.
There are a number of federal circuit cases where appellate courts
have addressed the factors to be considered in sanctioning counsel under
F.R.A.P. 38. These include:" 2
* Filing a one sentence brief without any supporting authority or
analysis." 3
* Filing a meritless appeal and then defending against sanctions
on the grounds that the client with his contract obliged him to
take an appeal; further, in taking an appeal after counsel be-
lieved it had some merit, counsel "exercised conspicuously bad
judgment."" 4
* Filing an appeal that "had absolutely no prospect of success and
... taxed the resources of this Court, the district court, and the
defendants.""
* Making a claim that was "hyper-technical," that was "totally
lacking in support and substance," and that "was designed to
fail" on appeal because the result was foreordained by "clearly
established law to the contrary."' 16
* Plaintiff's counsel filing an appeal solely as to the award of at-
torney's fees without the client's consent and proceeding in
"conduct throughout the course of this appeal [that] was ill-
advised, if not improper."" 7
In suspending an attorney from practice, the court In Re Solerwitz,
848 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. den. 488 U.S. 1004 (1989) found
that an attorney not only had filed a frivolous appeal, but had also failed
to follow court rules. The fact that three legal experts testified in his de-
fense did not help the hapless attorney, who had continued to press more
than 100 appeals that were deemed frivolous. While the case was, in the
court's own words, "unusual" (id. at 1581), the court's observations,
sometimes quoting from the rule to show cause and sometimes quoting
from other cases, is worth noting and are set forth in some detail in the
following footnote." 8
"' Chambers v. Nasco, 115 L.Ed.2d 27, 501 U.S. 1269, 1112 S.Ct. 12 (1991).
112 For an article on this point, see Maureen Middleton, "Ethical Issues Unique To
Appellate Practice," http://www.fmglaw.com/artapp.htm.
113 Dungaree Realty, Inc. v. U.S., 30 F.3d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
114 South Star Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 949 F.2d 450, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
115 Flexible Mfg. Systems Pty. v. Super Products, 86 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1996).
116 Perry v. Pogemiller, 16 F.3d 138, 140 (7 " Cir. 1993).
" Soliman v. Ebasco Services, Itc., 822 F.2d 320, 323 (2 nd Cir. 1987).
1s Emphasis has been supplied: "In his briefs in those appeals, 107 of which were
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Another case where a court imposed sanctions involved an attempt
to disqualify a trial judge on grounds that the U.S. Fifth Circuit deemed
"totally without merit; indeed, they are almost laughable. What is not
humorous is the attack on the district court and the great waste of judicial
time and resources."119 The Court also took judicial notice of a post-
hearing song issued by an attorney on a compact disc, a song that at-
tacked the trial judge. The Fifth Circuit was not amused, for even though
some of the lyrics might have been "fairly clever, . . . they were not writ-
ten by a folksinger or a balladeer. They were penned by a lawyer, an of-
virtually identical, [The attorney] disregarded Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure and
this court's rules, failed to file appendices, provided no citations to the record, ignored
authorities cited by the government, advanced numerous arguments on issues not on
appeal, and repeatedly raised contentions not raised before the Merit Systems Protection
Board. [The attorney's] briefs were devoid of any showing on which the decision ap-
pealed from could even possibly be reversed, devoid of any basis on which the precedents
of this court could be distinguished in law or fact, and devoid of any effort to make such
distinctions, in total disregard of this court's written instructions of December 10, 1984.
* * * [The attorney]' conduct in filing and maintaining frivolous appeals having no color-
able basis in fact or law has wasted the time and limited resources of this court, has de-
nied availability of the court's resources to deserving litigants, and has constituted fla-
grant and totally inexcusable abuse of the judicial process. [The attorney]' conduct has
been "unbecoming a member of the bar of the court", Fed.R.App.P. 46(b). * * * Respon-
dent also cited counsel's frequent, repeated, and brazen violations of this court's rules.
[The attorney]' reply briefs simply ignored those citations, merely stating that the earlier
cases were distinguishable (but citing no distinguishing factors), ignored Respondent's
charge that he had failed to cite to the record, and stated that the appeal was filed to give
Des Vignes access to the court. Faced with clear and insurmountable indication that all
131 appeals were frivolous, [The attorney] has continued to maintain this and the other
130 appeals. * * * The views of the expert witnesses, while based in part on established
tenets of the legal profession, do not fully outline the duties of a lawyer nor do they pro-
vide a complete picture of the specific issues before the court in this proceeding. An at-
torney's obligations to provide zealous advocacy on behalf of his client are not absolute
and uncompromising, but must be viewed in light of his additional obligations as an offi-
cer of the court to promote the administration of justice and to comply with the court's
rules, notices, and orders. Additionally, as with his obligations to his client, the attor-
ney's obligations to the court are ongoing at every stage of the litigation and the attorney
must continually reevaluate the positions advanced in light of both the development of the
litigation itself and of the relevant case law affecting the litigation. * * * [The attorney]
further argues, with the support of the expert witnesses, that his failure to comply with
the court's rules and orders governing the filing and form of briefs and the filing of ap-
pendices was not his responsibility but resulted from the inability of his small law firm to
comply with those requirements within the time deadlines. Judge Bennett correctly re-jected this contention. He pointed out that "[iut is difficult to fathom how a 3-person prac-
tice, even in ideal circumstances, could adequately ... handle 154 court appeals for 736
individuals, given the relatively short time frame in which all of the actions arose. If the
firm's personnel turnover and shortages were so severe as not to allow compliance with
the briefing and record filing requirements of the court, [The attorney] should have re-
ferred some of his clients to other firms or taken alternative means to insure adequate
representation for them."
" Traveler's Insurance Company v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1409
(1994).
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ficer of the very court being ridiculed, who had been unsuccessful re-
peatedly in these actions in that court." 20
The Fifth Circuit also has affirmed sanctions against a lawyer who
sought to recuse a judge and, when the motion to recuse was denied,
filed an appeal "alleging specific actions of impropriety that have no ba-
sis in the record."' 2'
The Fifth Circuit has not hesitated to impose sanctions under
F.R.A.P. 38 when appropriate, but the Court has noted that merely bring-
ing novel procedural issues'2 or filing an appeal of an issue of first im-
pression for the Court cannot be the basis of either sanctions or the styl-
ing of the matter as frivolous .123
When the Fifth Circuit has imposed sanctions, the conduct has
tended to be egregious. In Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
117 F.3d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1997), sanctions were imposed against pro se
plaintiffs who made "ridiculous allegations that the Internal Revenue
Code is the product of an illegal conspiracy."
In Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 23 F.3d 930 (La. 1994),
$20,000 in attorneys fees plus double taxable costs were cast against the
plaintiffs and their counsel for a frivolous appeal. Counsel for the plain-
tiffs had alleged that the defendant's lawyer had engaged in improper, ex
parte contacts with the district judge, the magistrate judge, and with their
law clerks. The Court's language is strong.124"Importantly, the plaintiffs'
S2o Id.
121 In Matter ofRaspanti, - F.3d -, No. 06-31252 (5t' Cir. 4/14/08).
'2 EHM v. Amtrak Board of Directors, 780 F.2d 516 (5" Cir. 1986).
12 Estiverne v. Sak's Fifth Avenue, 9 F.2d 1171 (5' Cir. 1993).
124 "Larry's legal arguments are also frivolous and independently deserving of sanc-
tions. * * * Larry seeks to mislead this court about the circumstances of the alleged im-
proper contacts. He attempts to prove his conclusion of unethical conduct by Phillips's
counsel by seriously misquoting defendants' counsel's time records, omitting important
facts from the description of counsel's activities, and drawing unsupported conclusions. *
* * Serenely undeterred by his lack of success, Larry has renewed his personal attack
against defendants' counsel in this court.
***
"In advancing his claim, Larry has attempted to mislead the court by blatantly
misrepresenting the record. * * * We will not stand by idly and allow an attorney to
waste the time of this court and maliciously denigrate the reputations of judges and other
officers of the court.
"Moreover, Larry has not explained, either in his brief or in his ample opportunity
at oral argument, why he has raised this issue at all. He has asked for no remedy, such as
overturning the judgment. His only discernible motive is to cast brickbats and to "poison
the well" by tattling on his opponent. Such motives hardly justify his baseless allegations
and his attempt to lie to this court regarding what is in the record.
"Upon determination that an appeal is frivolous, we "may award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee." Fed.R.App.P. 38. Larry has attempted to mislead
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assertions, made through Larry, are not based upon any reasonable or
good-faith reading of applicable law. They are utterly baseless and bi-
zarre.
The Fifth Circuit has been careful to scrutinize the actions of law-
yers who use sanction motions as a tactical device. In Walker v. City of
Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 241 (5" Cir. 1999), the Court refused to award
sanctions because both parties "contributed to the disharmony in the pro-
ceedings." The Court also noted that while Rule 11 does not directly ap-
ply to appellate proceedings,125 it is "guidance in imposing Rule 38 sanc-
tions." Id.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806 (5'
Cir. 1988) on sanctions is also worthy of note, for it discusses the rule
applicable to 28 U.S.C. §1927.126 "We accept arguendo that the appeal
this court for no legitimate end. He has wasted the time and energy of opposing counsel
and of this court. As a result, we exercise our power to impose sanctions on plaintiffs and
their counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.
125 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,406, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d
359 (1990).
126 "This is an interlocutory appeal .. from the district court's denial of [a] motion for
summary judgment ...
"Because there are disputed issues of material fact concerning the qualified immu-
nity defense, we lack jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we
dismiss. In addition, because counsel for appellant has multiplied these proceedings un-
reasonably and vexatiously, we impose sanctions against counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1927. " In substance, Johns urges two points on appeal. * * * The first argument is spe-
cious, the second is frivolous, and neither merits extended discussion.
"Underlying the sanctions provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is the recognition that
frivolous appeals and arguments waste scarce judicial resources and increase legal fees
charged to parties. See Carnon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir.1994); Plat-
tenburg v. Allstate Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 562, 562 (5th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we hold that
§ 1927 sanctions are appropriate in this case against Johns' attorney because of his argu-
ments to this Court that the Autopsy Report was not properly authenticated when, in
truth, (i) the attorney had no reason to doubt the document's accuracy, (ii) the document
was produced to opposing counsel by a witness who was also represented by Johns' at-
torney, and (iii) the attorney's own expert witnesses rely upon a copy of the same Au-
topsy Report.
"We are mindful that §1927 sanctions should not be assessed without fair notice
and without giving the attorney an opportunity to respond. See Alizadeh v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234,236 (5th Cir.1990), citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 762-63, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2462, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). However, in their brief-
ing to this Court, plaintiffs strenuously argued that the instant appeal was frivolous. Then,
at oral argument, we questioned Johns' counsel at length about the basis for his rgu-
ments conceming the Autopsy Report. Counsel for Johns responded to these issues at oral
argument and later in post-argument briefs. We are convinced, therefore, that counsel has
received notice that we were considering sanctions against him and has enjoyed sufficient
opportunity to respond. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988); Farguson
v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
"We conclude that, pursuant to §28 U.S.C. S 1927, appellant's attorney should be
assessed the attorney's fees of appellees' counsel and all costs incurred in this appeal. * *
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here was not taken merely to vex the Waterworks District. Nonetheless,
the appeal was patently meritless and had as its natural consequence fur-
ther unwarranted expense and inconvenience for the defendants. Thus,
we must consider whether sanctions are necessary. . ."
What if, before a suit is filed, a lawyer in negotiations called the
opposing attorneys "stooges and puppets, a weak pussyfooting deadhead
who had been dead mentally for ten years"? What if the lawyer accused
opposing counsel as demonstrating legal incompetence, using ludicrous
additional time and expense to run up the bill on their clients, utilizing
their clients as a private piggybank? What if the lawyer called the oppos-
ing counsel's client a hayseed and washed-up has been who surrounded
himself in a company of scoundrels?
Do you think that you could turn that lawyer in for a violation of
any Rule of Professional Conduct,127 or, if you did, that the complaint
would be pursued? On the other hand, what would happen if the lawyer
made these statements in a deposition or in open court? This situation
was litigated in the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In that case, the
appellate court found that such obnoxious and abusive behavior by an
attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding warranted a $25,000 sanction. 128
* Accordingly, we award reasonable attorneys fees of $20,643.75 and costs to the appel-
lees' counsel." Baulch v. Johns, 70 F.3d 813, 818 (5" Cir. 1995).
"An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or the arguments of error are wholly
without merit. See, e.g., Atwood v. Union Carbide Corp., 847 F.2d 278, (5th Cir.1988)
(partial attorneys' fees for frivolous appeal). Appeal here was patently frivolous, even if
the original suit, arguendo, was not entirely devoid of colorable merit. * * *This appeal
was taken "in the face of clear, unambiguous, dispositive holdings of this and other ap-
pellate courts." Capps v. Eggers, 782 F.2d 1341, 1343 (5th Cir.1986). See McDougal v.
Comm'r, 818 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1987) ("[Appellant's claims] were advanced in the
teeth of firnly established rules of law for which there is no arguably reasonable expecta-
tion of reversal or favorable modification."); Stelly v. Comm'r (where the baselessness of
the challenge had been fully elaborated by both the IRS and the Tax Court, the pro se
plaintiffs understood the legal issues and were subject to sanctions); Cummings v. United
States, 648 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. Unit A Jun. 1981) (sanctions for frivolous appeal where
subject-matter jurisdiction patently lacking).
127 Being nasty dosn't appear to fall strictly under the strictures of the eight categories
of Rule 8.4, "Misconduct."
128 In the Matter of First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., 282 F.3d 864 (51, Cir.
2002). The court stated:
[The lawyer's] obnoxious behavior, however, was not limited to . . . [the] deposi-
tion. Some of the other statements made by [the attorney] during the bankruptcy
proceeding ... are the following:
He characterized other attorneys, including an Assistant United States Attor-
ney, as (1) a "stooge"; (2) a "puppet"; (3) a -weak pussyfooting 'deadhead' "
who "had been 'dead' mentally for ten years"; (4) "various incompetents";
(5)"inept"; (6) "clunks"; (7) "falling all over themselves, and wasting endless
hours"; (8) "a bunch of starving slobs"; and (6) an "underling who graduated
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Even in cases where sanctions have not been imposed, the 5 th Cir-
cuit has not hesitated to express its displeasure: "On the spectrum of dis-
ingenuous theories of defense, we view those advanced [by the defen-
dants] as lying somewhere between the wholly specious and the down-
right frivolous.' 29
U.S. Fifth Circuit opinions have even criticized lawyers for unpro-
fessional actions during oral argument, including noting a lawyer's "ca-
valier disregard for his client's interest and for his obligations to the
Court" in a way that "was both troubling and disgraceful."' o
from a 29th-tier law school." He called the chairman of First City a "hay-
seed" and a "washed-up has been," and he also called other First City direc-
tors "scoundrels." . He referred to one law firm . . . as "stooges" of another
law firm He referred to the work of other attorneys as "garbage" that
demonstrated "legal incompetence" while involving "ludicrous additional
time and expense." He asserted that [one law firm] was using First City as a
"private piggybank." * * *
The bankruptcy court found that [the attomey's] "egregious, obnoxious, and insult-
ing behavior ... constituted an unwarranted imposition upon and an affront to [the
bankruptcy court] and the parties and practitioners who have appeared in this bank-
ruptcy that should not have to be endured in the future." Accordingly, the bank-
ruptcy court imposed a monetary sanction * * *
[The attorney] does not dispute the factual basis of the bankruptcy court's sanction
order. He thus concedes that he made the myriad rude and insulting comments out-
lined above. [He] defends his comments in two ways. First, he argues that the
statements he made were, for the most part, correct. We find this argument utterly
meritless. [The attorney] was never engaged in stating plain facts-he was engaged
in hurling gratuitous and hyperbolic insults. Second, [the attorney] argues that the
actions of both the court and the opposing attorneys caused his abusive conduct.
Obviously, any error on the part of the court or motive on the part of opposing at-
torneys in filing the sanction motion did not give [him] carte blanche to launch per-
sonal attacks and to defy the court's directive to cease his wholly unprofessional
conduct.
129 Federal Insurance Co. v. CompUSA, Inc. and James F. Halpern, 319 F.3d 746 ( 5 th
Cir. 2003).
130 Hartz v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational fund, _ F.3d _, No. 07-
30506 (5th Cir. 4/16/08). The Court quoted a portion of the transcript of oral argument to
illustrate its point:
"Judge: What do you do about Morgan? [A U.S. Supreme court case directly on
point].
Phipps: I don't, I don't, I don't know Morgan, Your Honor.
Judge: You don't know Morgan?
Phipps: Nope.
Judge: You haven't read it?
Phipps: I try not to read that many cases, your Honor.
Judge: I must say, Morgan is a case that is directly relevant to this case. And for
you representing the Plaintiff to get up here - it's a Supreme Court case - and say you
haven't read it. Where did they teach you that?
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15. What About Federal District Courts?
It is beyond the scope of this paper to look at the constantly evolv-
ing and seemingly limitless area of Rule 11 jurisprudence. There are lit-
erally hundreds of publications and articles that track this field."' Suffice
it to say that federal district courts have not been hesitant to use either the
threat of sanctions or actual sanctions to control egregious behavior,
while at the same time casting a dim eye on a counsel's attempts to use
sanctions as litigation tactics.
16. Family Law Negotiations
In one of the few reported cases involving pre-litigation negotiations
that do not involve securities or a sale of property nor a writing by a law-
yer who was alleged to have acted wrongfully is Stare v. Tate.13 2 Arising
out of a property settlement in a divorce case, the wife's attorney, through
a series of negotiations, offered a property settlement with a serious mis-
take in the valuation of the property; the mistake was to the wife's detri-
ment. The husband's attorney was aware of the mistake and counter of-
fered using the same mistaken valuation number. The counter offer was
accepted by the wife's attorney and the instrument reflecting the counter
offer was later approved by a court as a property settlement. After the
divorce became final, the former husband, apparently seeking to rub salt
in the wound, sent the former wife a copy of the mistaken valuation with
a notation on it, "Please note $100,000.00 mistake in your figures." After
receiving the note the former wife filed suit to revoke the property set-
tlement. The court allowed the property settlement to be revoked on the
notion of unilateral mistake. Underlying the court's holding, although not
explicit, is the implication that the former husband's attorney, who had
knowledge of the mistake by making the counter offer, had the duty to
inform his opposing counsel of the mistake in valuation.
Arguably the husband's lawyer's behavior did not fall within the
prohibition of Rule 4.1, which only prohibits making a "false statement
of material facts." While the Comment to Rule 4.1 states that a misrepre-
sentation can occur "if a lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of
another that the lawyer knows is false," the valuation arguably was not
Phipps: They didn't teach me much, Your Honor."
1 See, e.g., Joseph, G.P., "Recent Decisions: Rule 11, Inherent Power, 28 U.S.C. §
1927," American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education
June 6-7, 2002 21st Century Litigation, SGl03 ALI-ABA 293; also see SE63 ALI-ABA
79; 6 Fed. Litigator 155 (2002), "Remedies Unfiled Document May Lead to Rule 11
Sanctions"; Gerber, Robert, "Bringing and Resisting Rule 11 Sanctions, " 47 AmJur Tri-
als 521; Butler, M. "Rule 11 Sanctions and a Lawyer's Failure to Conduct Competent
Legal Research," 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 681 (2002); "Sanctions -- Rule 11 -- 'Safe Harbor'
11 Fed. Litigator 287 (2001); Soocher, S., "Rule 11 Sanctions in 'Lion Sleeps' Case " 3
Ent. L. & Fin. 1 (2000).
132 21 Cal. App. 3d 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. 2d 1971).
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false, simply mistakenly low. Would a bar association discipline the hus-
band's lawyer in this instance? Would there be endless arguments wheth-
er the valuation was "false" and whether the husband's lawyer made a
"statement" or merely remained silent. Was the statement "material?" Is
this the type of problem that Justice Marshall would have no problem
disposing of as in Laidlaw v. Organ, holding that the information is
equally available to both sides?
17. Non-Louisiana Bar Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Negotia-
tions
While there are a few Louisiana cases involving discipline of law-
yers for tactics in negotiations, 3 3 nationwide cases where ethics of non-
litigation negotiations were the subject of state bar association discipli-
nary proceedings are few and far between.
An interesting proceeding is Commission on Legal Ethics v. Printz,
416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1992), in which the state Supreme Court dis-
missed charges against an attorney for whom the bar had recommended
public discipline. The attorney handled negotiations between his father
and the father's employee, who embezzled over $300,000.00 from the
company. Originally, the employee agreed to cooperate, to work for the
company until it was sold, and to help find the missing funds. The em-
bezzler's father was then called to a meeting whose purpose "unques-
tionably was to determine if [the father] would cover the losses caused
by the son."'"4 Afterwards, the lawyer sent the embezzler a "final de-
mand" letter giving him a choice between a "strict financial arrange-
ment" for repayment of the embezzled money or criminal prosecution."
Only after the negotiations broke down was the son turned over to au-
thorities and later convicted. The court found no problem with the attor-
ney's action. There was no violation of West Virginia law.'" Likewise,
no violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) was found, and the court
noted this rule was not brought forward into the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Although its sanctions applied to the conduct of the attorney at
the time, Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A), which prohibits a lawyer from
n33 See, e.g., In re: Frank, 04-0238 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 57, where a lawyer was
disbarred for (among many other things) having "made misrepresentations during settle-
ment negotiations." This language of Frank has been cited a number of times, including
by In re Turissini, 2006-0172 (La. 4/24/06), 927 So.2d 1105, 1119.
13 Commission on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d at 722.
"s Although a West Virginia statute prohibited a victim of a crime from seeking resti-
tution in lieu of criminal prosecution, the court found this statute "void under the Doc-
trine of Desuetude," 416 S.E.2d 720 and 727. The Doctrine of Desuetude is based upon
the concept of an old law so out of use that it would be unfair to apply it today. It is inter-
esting to note that in ruling on Desuetude, the court quoted from Pryor v. Gainer, 177
W.Va. 218, 225, 351 S.E.2d 404, 411 (1986), which itself cited the applicable principle
"found in Book 10 of the Digest of Justinian." Of course, the Justinian Code was one of
the foundations of the civil law.
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threatening to present criminal charges only to obtain an advantage in
civil matters, was found by the court to be "unworkable." The court
quoted from Professors Hazard and Hodes' book, The Law of Lawyering,
A Handbook On The Model Rules OfProfessional Conduct,136 that one of
the reasons that Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) was omitted from the Model
Rules was because the standards "were overbroad, because they prohibit
legitimate pressure tactics and negotiation strategies." (emphasis sup-
plied). Obviously, the West Virginia Supreme Court has a high regard
for "legitimate pressure tactics and negotiation strategies." The court did
not even address the question of whether the lawyer had an ethical duty
to turn the embezzler over once the embezzlement was discovered, par-
ticularly since the attorney had no attorney-client relationship with the
embezzler, but, rather, with the corporation which was itself defrauded.
Why should the attorney's desire to have the corporation made whole
allow the attorney to remain silent and refuse to turn over to the law an
admitted felon? Certainly, such a rule would not apply had the corpora-
tion been a national bank, because there are specific rules that require
disclosure of employee-committed crimes to the pertinent authorities.
New Jersey has disbarred lawyers who commit fraud in negotia-
tions. Matter of Silverman,'3 7 involved a lawyer who had put together
improper financial statements in an attempt to obtain financing for him-
self and his client and even had "acquiesced in [the client's] forger of
[the client's] wife's signature on the . . . loan guarantee."138 Yet, as is
136 Section 4.4:103 (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1990).
137 113 N.J. 193, 549 A.2d 1225 (1988).
138 Id. at 210, 211:
Our independent review of the facts admits of no conclusion other than that re-
spondent committed numerous ethical transgressions, demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence in the record. In his zeal to obtain adequate financing to con-
summate the acquisition of HLW, respondent prepared various statements and doc-
uments containing knowing misrepresentations of highly material facts. For exam-
ple, in the prospectus, containing both his and Ferber's financial statements, and on
the Liberty Loan application, respondent exaggerated or created non-existent assets
and ignored or understated significant liabilities. Respondent altered the net income
figure of the Kaufman 1978 HLW financial statement and, along with the prospec-
tus, submitted it to the Weir group; respondent also altered, without Ferber's know-
ledge, a key figure on the closing memorandum agreement dictated by Robertson.
Further, several misrepresentations were effected by omissions on respondent's
part: (1) in his June Twelfth letter to Waters respondent enclosed the Liberty com-
mitment letter without disclosing that it had been revoked; (2) at the closing re-
spondent signed the Robertson memorandum, which stated inter alia that there had
been no material adverse change in HLW's financial condition since the first of the
year, but failed to reveal that he had executed an agreement with Waters acknowl-
edging the alleged existence of such adverse change; and (3) respondent withheld
from Ferber and Robertson many of the details concerning side agreements he had
made with Mento, Weir, and others that affected the stability of HLW. Respondent
also acquiesced in Ferber's forgery of his wife's signature on the Manufacturers
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shown by the language in Baldasarre, actions short of fraud have not
been heavily scrutinized when the lawyer is seen as assisting the client
within the scope of the Model Rules, even if a third party is harmed.
Whether that result will be the same in the future remains to be seen.
18. Tax Issues
In Largen v. U.S., 1995 WL 556621 (M.D. Fla. 1995), 76
A.F.T.R.2ds 95-5815, the IRS won a case on summary judgment when
the taxpayers asserted that they had been coerced into a settlement. Al-
though the Court found that the IRS behavior was blatant enough for the
taxpayers to have stated a claim, the claim was barred because the tax-
payers engaged in "misleading silence" during the settlement negotia-
tions. Excerpts from the case appear in the following footnote:13 9 "While
Hanover loan guarantee.
"In 1982, Dr. Largen and Dr. Clontz attended a seminar at which International
Capital Management (hereinafter ICM), a licensee of United States Tax Planning Service,
promoted investment packages. After the meeting, they met with Dr. Vincent Cremata, a
physician-turned-financial advisor who worked for ICM. Through Dr. Cremata, Dr. Lar-
gen and Dr. Clontz, both individually and through Largen & Clontz, invested in addi-
tional malpractice insurance, commodities, and several other ventures. Dr. Largen later
said he felt secure investing with Dr. Cremata because he believed that Dr. Cremata, as a
"fellow physician," would be honest and ethical. Thereafter, Dr. and Mrs. Largen and Dr.
and Mrs. Clontz took personal income tax deductions for business losses related to the
investments for tax years 1982 and 1983. Dr. and Mrs. Largen later carried investment
tax credits back to 1979 and 1980; Dr. and Mrs. Clontz carried credits back to 1979,
1980, and 1981. Largen & Clontz deducted insurance expenses and financial planning
expenses from its corporate tax liability for fiscal years ending in 1982, 1983, and 1984.
In March 1984, Special Agents Hawkins and Hood of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (hereinafter IRS) went to Dr. and Mrs. Clontz's residence, intending to speak to Dr.
Clontz. When Mrs. Clontz informed them that her husband was on the golf course, not at
home, Special Agent Hawkins insisted that she call him. She reached Dr. Clontz by tele-
phone and Special Agent Hawkins told him that they would have to meet to discuss po-
tential criminal income tax evasion charges. Dr. Clontz told Special Agent Hawkins that
he would be available at his office the next day. During the entire encounter, Special
Agent Hood played with the Clontz family dog in the kitchen in a friendly manner.
On the following day, Special Agents Hawkins and Hood went to Largen &
Clontz's business office to inform the doctors that they were viewed as suspects in a
criminal tax evasion scheme. Dr. Clontz, who met with Special Agent Hawkins alone
because Dr. Largen was in surgery, alleges that Special Agent Hawkins called him a
"common criminal and insinuated that his intentions were to put [Dr. Clontz] in jail
forthwith." Special Agent Hawkins read Dr. Clontz his Miranda rights, at which point Dr.
Clontz stated that he wished to speak to an attorney. Upon Dr. Clontz's invocation of his
right to counsel, Special Agents Hawkins and Hood left the offices. Neither Dr. Clontz or
Mrs. Clontz had any further personal contact with IRS agents.
Soon after the agents left, Dr. Clontz telephoned Dr. Largen to discuss what had
transpired. Together they decided to retain counsel and, therefore, contacted John Robert-
son (hereinafter Mr. Robertson), who represented them before the IRS and U.S. Attorney
in criminal tax matters from that point forward. Mr. Robertson engaged the services of
Paulette Smith, CPA (hereinafter Ms. Smith) to facilitate his representation. Ms. Smith
performed accounting work and, along with Mr. Robertson, interacted with the IRS on
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Plaintiffs' behalf.
Although Dr. Largen and Dr. Clontz were apparent targets of the grand jury inves-
tigation, they were never indicted. * * * In November 1988, after the criminal investiga-
tion of the doctors was finished, the IRS began civil examination of their tax returns. * *
* On August 11, 1989, Plaintiffs' claims for deductions .. .were denied at the conclusion
of the audit.
Plaintiffs appealed the denial of deductions administratively. *** Thereafter, Ms.
Moreau and Ms. Smith began informal settlement negotiations to reach a mutually ac-
ceptable resolution of the tax issues. Ms. Smith alleges that Ms. Moreau proposed a set-
tlement agreement which she said Plaintiffs would have to accept to avoid civil fraud
penalties being reinstated in full. The settlement was to be memorialized upon a Form
870-AD, which provides on the reverse, among other terms, * * * Mr. Robertson advised
Dr. Largen and Dr. Clontz that the IRS was trying to reach an informal settlement in or-
der to forestall a challenge in district court. Mr. Robertson stated that he had previously
told the doctors that they could refuse to pay the taxes on the disallowed deductions and
challenge the IRS decision in the United States Tax Court or pay the taxes and challenge
the decision in the United States District Court. He warned, however, that the form used
for informal settlements, form 870-AD, although generally unenforceable, had been held
by some courts to estop taxpayers from challenging the allocation of taxes. The doctors
said they felt compelled to sign the agreement to avoid greater liability and publicity.
* **
In late August 1991, Dr. and Mrs. Largen and Dr. and Mrs. Clontz both filed a
1040X amended personal income tax return for the years to which the informal settle-
ment applied. Largen & Clontz filed a 1120X amended corporate income tax return for
the disputed years. The IRS disallowed the claimed changes because none of the agreed
grounds for reopening the issues settled by the 870- AD settlement was presented. On
May 6, 1993, Plaintiffs filed this action for the IRS's denial of the amended tax computa-
tions. Although the filing was timely, the three year statute of limitations upon the origi-
nal taxes has lapsed. Defendant seeks pre-trial resolution of only those claims asserted by
Dr. and Mrs. Clontz.
To maintain an action, Plaintiffs must set forth and detail the basis upon which they
believe they are due a refund-that the deductions and investment tax credits were based
upon a reasonable belief that a profit could be realized over the term of the leases upon
the tapes. Plaintiffs may face the a daunting task in showing that they were unduly influ-
enced to enter into the settlement agreement as an essential element of their case, but no
law or regulation commands them to disclose the grounds upon which they intend to
rebut the validity of the agreement in order to maintain an action in this Court.
Although an informal tax settlement agreement is not enforceable under law, how-
ever, the parties to the agreement may be estopped from denying its enforcement in eq-
uity. The Botany Mills Court refused to address the question of whether estoppel could
bind the parties to a settlement agreement, but the Supreme Court later found that estop-
pel may arise from an informal tax agreement. Botany Mills, 278 U.S. at 289; R.H.
Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934). In determining whether a tax-
payer should be estopped from challenging an informal settlement, courts have relied
upon general equitable principles regarding estoppel. To estop a taxpayer from claiming
that an informal settlement agreement is not binding, the Government must show:
1. the taxpayer engaged in a false representation or wrongful misleading silence;
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their choice was difficult and painful, it is far from unique. All parties to
potential litigation, when offered a settlement, must weigh the odds of
prevailing upon a claim and potential gains against possible liabilities.
The choice is never easy, but it is not unfair or inequitable. If a settle-
ment agreement is so one-sided as to be unacceptable to one of the par-
ties, that party need only make a more palatable counteroffer and reject
the original offer. That is seemingly what occurred in this case. Plaintiffs
and Defendant negotiated until they reached a resolution to which all
could agree. That Plaintiffs wish the settlement were more favorable
does not render it inequitable, for a party scarcely gets all that it desires.
Defendant therefore does not have unclean hands by dint of negotiating
with Plaintiffs until they reached a settlement agreement that forced them
to make difficult emotional and economic choices."
In Avers v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo 1988-176, 55 T.C.M. 678, the Tax
Court held that the Service did not violate the taxpayer's constitutional
rights of equal protection by refusing to offer the same deal to that tax-
payer in a partnership investment as had been offered to other investors
in similar or identical partnerships in prior years.14
2. the error originated in a statement of fact, not in opinion or statement of law;
3. the Government, in claiming the benefit of estoppel, did not know the true facts;
4. the Government is adversely affected by the acts or statements of the taxpayer
against whom estoppel is claimed.
Lignos v. United States, 439 F.2d 1365, 1368 (2d Cir.1971); Stair, 516 F.2d at 564.
Courts have differed, however, over what could be considered a sufficient showing
of misrepresentation or misleading silence. Some have required only that the taxpayer
entered into an informal settlement then permitted the statute of limitations to run to find
misleading silence. Those courts have inferred that the taxpayer's failure to repudiate the
settlement before the running of the statute of limitations was intended to lull the Gov-
ernment into inaction.
However, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant should not be able to invoke the equi-
table powers of the Court to remedy the legal deficiencies of the settlement agreement,
even if precedent supports its position. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant acted with unclean
hands in reaching the 870-AD settlement agreement and therefore may not ask the Court
to intercede equitably. They claim that Special Agent Hawkins's statements and actions,
the convening of a grand jury, and the alleged production of grand jury materials to the
IRS Civil Audit division were unfair and illegal. Plaintiffs therefore contend that Defen-
dant should not be permitted to implore the Court to estop Plaintiffs from repudiating the
settlement agreement. * * * Plaintiffs first allege that they were forced into signing the
settlement agreement by emotional and economic coercion. The contend they were forced
into the Hobbesian choice between potentially enormous civil fraud penalties and forego-
ing their right to have their tax claims heard before the Court. If they refused to settle and
appealed the IRS's denial of deductions to the Court, they would expose themselves to
both negative publicity and possible bankruptcy. However, by entering into the settle-
ment, they would likely lose their right to appeal the denial of the deductions, which they
believed were properly taken. Plaintiffs were forced to choose between a certain sum
forfeited to the IRS and their reputations and, potentially, millions of dollars.
140 As the court stated:
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In both Larkin and Avers, the IRS won although their tactics were
less than admirable. The question therefore is whether "professionalism"
requires something more than the absolute minimum the law allows,
something more than the absolute minimum the law permits. Does "pro-
fessionalism" mean something other than winning at all costs?
19. Conflict of Law Issues: Multi-jurisdictional Practice
There is no single, nationally-recognized non-litigation ethical rule
that applies to all lawyers. Given the lack of a single, uniform set of Bar
rules on ethical obligations, which law a court later applies may have a
huge impact on a lawyer's potential liability for alleged unethical con-
duct. If a lawyer is licensed in State A, negotiates a deal with a lawyer in
State B, involving a corporation located in State C and incorporated in
State D, involving a transaction that occurs in State E, then there are po-
tentially five different state ethical rules that might or might not apply. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with an analysis of this area, but
attorneys engaged in multi-state transactions must proceed cautiously,
for it is possible that a court in one state may find a higher standard of
Next, petitioners maintain that respondent's failure to extend the identical settle-
ment offer to all Koala investors violated the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment due process clause. The Detroit Appeals Office arrived at a set-
tlement position allowing Koala investors to deduct 60 percent of their out-of-
pocket expenses (cash investment) made in 1981: This position was a departure
from the previously existing policy of allowing a 100 percent deduction of initial
investments made in tax shelters during taxable years prior to 1981. Before the new
policy was fully implemented nationwide, various 1981 Koala investors received
and accepted settlement offers of the 100 percent out-of-pocket deductions. Peti-
tioners, therefore, insist that they are also entitled to the 100-percent deduction for
1981. We disagree. * * *
We reject petitioners' contention that they should be extended the same settlement
offer as was extended to those who invested in Koala during 1979 and 1980 The
mere offer of a particular settlement in a previous year does not require respondent
to offer the same proposal in a later year. It is well settled that each tax year is in-
dependent from any other, and the Commissioner may challenge in a succeeding
year that which he condoned or agreed to in a former year. Harrah's Club v. United
States, 661 F.2d 203, 205 (Ct. Cl. 1981), and cases cited therein.
In order to prevail on their allegation regarding the 1981 settlement proposal, peti-
tioners must demonstrate that others similarly situated have been extended a more
favorable settlement offer for 1981, based on the same circumstances, and that re-
spondent's discriminatory selection was based on impermissible considerations or
an arbitrary classification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Penn-Field Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 720, 723 (1980), and cases cited therein.
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that there was any selectivity on the part of
respondent in extending better settlement offers to others. His settlement offers
were not dictated by law, but rather by efforts to reach amicable settlements of a
large number of cases efficiently.
Respondent does not have to demonstrate that his settlement offers were fair. Peti-
tioners could reject them if they were not. (Emphasis supplied)
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care than the Bar of the state in which the attorney is licensed.'4 ' Further,
a lawyer has a duty not to handle matters for which he or she is not quali-
fled; handling matters that are controlled by the substantive laws of an-
other state should at least give an attorney some concern.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the conflict of law
issues, 142 but attorneys who are concerned about this matter may wish to
look at the Louisiana Bar Association's and the ABA's Multijurisdic-
tional Practice Rule 5.5. The Rule differentiates between the "temporary"
practice of law in another jurisdiction, which is generally allowed under
the following circumstances:
a. You associate a local lawyer (the co-counsel situation).
b. The matter is "reasonably related" to a "pending or potential
proceeding." This applies, however, only in a tribunal setting. If
there is no case upcoming but merely negotiations, there is no safe
harbor.
c. There is a mediation, arbitration, or ADR going on in another
jurisdiction where you are admitted as a matter of right to handle the
ADR (and not pro hac).
d. The matter is "reasonably related" to your practice in your own
jurisdiction. This allows for meetings out of state with witnesses or
parties to a transaction if the matter is being handled in your own
state. It also allows for multiple or recurring legal matters in multi-
ple jurisdictions if the client has an interest in having a single law-
yer represent it in all these matters, or if the lawyer has developed a
specialty expertise, such as in federal labor law or appellate law.
This may become an important "safe harbor" for many appellate at-
torneys.
e. Are services provided to the "lawyer's employer" - this pro-
tects in-house counsel in non-tribunal matters.
f. Or "are services that the lawyer is authorized to proved by fed-
eral law."
'14 For example, in NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
120 (W.D. La. 1989), affirmed and remanded, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), a Massachu-
setts lawyer was sanctioned by a federal judge in Louisiana under the court's "inherent
powers." In considering possible reciprocal discipline, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint after a complete review of the record, finding "no support" for
the charges or the sanctions. In the Matter of McCabe, 411 Mass. 436, 583 N.E. 2d 233
(Mass. 1991).
142 For cases on multijurisdictional practice issues, see: Birbrower, Montalbano, Con-
don & Frank, P.C., et al. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara, 949 P.2d I (Calif. S.Ct.
1998), and Fought & Company, Inc. v. Steel Engineering and Erection, Inc., 91 P.2d 487
(Hawaii S.Ct. 1998).
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What is prohibited is everything else, including the "systematic and
continuous" presence in a jurisdiction, although these terms are not de-
fined.
Also, it should be noted that lawyers who advise their clients about
the laws where the lawyer is not licensed to practice do so at their peril.
See Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046 (Del. Ch., Nov. 27, 2007) (foot-
notes omitted):
The question presented is a straightforward one. May a corporate
lawyer and his law firm be sued in Delaware as to claims arising out
of their actions in providing advice and services to a Delaware pub-
lic corporation, its directors, and its managers regarding matters of
Delaware corporate law when the lawyer and law firm: i) prepared
and delivered to Delaware for filing a certificate amendment under
challenge in the lawsuit; ii) advertise themselves as being able to
provide coast-to-coast legal services and as experts in matters of
corporate governance; iii) provided legal advice on a range of De-
laware law matters at issue in the lawsuit; iv) undertook to direct the
defense of the lawsuit; and v) face well-pled allegations of having
aided and abetted the top managers of the corporation in breaching
their fiduciary duties by entrenching and enriching themselves at the
expense of the corporation and its public stockholders? The answer
is yes.
As sophisticated practitioners of corporate law, the [law firm] de-
fendants realize that Delaware, as a chartering state, has an impor-
tant interest in regulating the internal affairs of its corporations, in
order to ensure that the directors and officers of Delaware corpora-
tions honor their obligations to operate the corporation lawfully and
in the best interest of the corporation's stockholders. The United
States Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy and im-
portance of a state's interest in regulating the internal affairs of its
corporations. It can also be no surprise to the moving defendants
that this important interest is given life in our state by providing
stockholders with access to Delaware's court system in order to as-
sert claims of breach of fiduciary duty; after all, decisions too nu-
merous to cite make this clear.
Given these realities, it is difficult to conceive how it would shock
the conscience to require the moving defendants to defend a lawsuit
in Delaware. As is clear, the moving defendants purported to pro-
vide a wide range of advice and services to the board and officers of
a Delaware corporation about important issues of Delaware law.
That advice and assistance included the conception, preparation, and
filing of the Certificate Amendment, which culminated in a filing in
Delaware. Indeed, it is difficult to find a part of the scheme attacked
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by the plaintiff that did not involve substantial participation by the
moving defendants.
As a more general matter, the moving defendants are poorly posi-
tioned to claim a violation of Due Process. Given its own self-
proclaimed national reach, [the non-Delaware law firm] is in a
graceless position to claim to be constitutionally aggrieved by an
exercise of jurisdiction by this court over it in a case where the
claims against it entirely rest on its actions in providing Delaware
law advice to a Delaware corporation. That is especially so when
[the non-Delaware law firm] has taken the role of quarterbacking
the defense of this action by drafting pleadings and briefs filed by
other lawyers with this court, directing the defendants' (inadequate,
incomplete, and untimely) responses to discovery, and even drafting
the briefs in support of this motion.
20. Can You Withdraw if Your Client Refuses to do what You Sug-
gest, and How Should You Withdraw - The "Silent" v. "Noisy"
Withdrawal.
Once you have figured out what rule applies and that you are in fact
at risk, what are you to do? E2K Model Rule 1.16 ("Declining or Termi-
nating Representation") suggests that one remedy for a lawyer is with-
drawal, and the comments to E2K Model Rulel.6 ("Confidentiality of
Information") indicate that the withdrawal can be "noisy": i.e., that you
can signal to the opposing side something more than the mere fact of
withdrawal by some indication that puts the opposing side on notice to
investigate further, such as a disavowal of work product.'4 1 ABA Formal
Opinion 92-366 attempted to illustrate the problem and provide a solu-
tion, but the ABA Committee's split 5-3 vote on the resolution did little
to provide reassurance that the rules are clear.'"
143 For discussions of "noisy withdrawals," see: C.R. Bowles, Jr., "Noisy Withdrawals:
Urban Bankruptcy Legend or Invaluable Ethical Tool?" 20 Oct. Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26
(2001); Daniel Pope and Helen Whatley Pope, "Ethics and Professionalism: Rule 1.6 and
the Noisy Withdrawal," 63 Def. Couns. J. 543 (1996); Michael R. Klein and Alan J. Ots-
field, "Noisy Withdrawal," 868 PLI/Corp. 529, Practising Law Institute Corporate Law
and Practice Handbook Series, 26th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, Nov. 1994.
144 Pope and Pope, supra, 63 Def. Counsel J. 543 at 544, contains this description:
"[The opinion concerned a hypothetical involving] a bank loan to a lawyer's client,
which was based, in part, on an opinion letter given by the lawyer to the bank. The
opinion letter was based on factual representations made by the president of the cli-
ent to the lawyer. The president later confessed to his lawyer that his representa-
tions were false-and intentionally so. The president fired the lawyer, telling him in
the process he intended to continue the fraud against the bank, he intended to con-
ceal the misrepresentations from new counsel, and he intended to expand his com-
pany's loan with the bank.
In a 5-to-3 opinion, the committee held:
1. Under Rule 1.6, the lawyer is prohibited from disclosing the client's prior fraud
or the client's intent to perpetuate a future fraud to anybody-- not the bank, not the
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What is one to do if you want to make a noisy withdrawal and
whom do you tell? Assuming that you won't get into trouble with the
client (who may sue you for breaching a confidence), and assuming that
you've got to say something, what do you say?
E2K Model Rule 1.16 allows an attorney to withdraw if it can be
accomplished without "material adverse effect on the interests of the cli-
ent.)14  A noisy withdrawal, however, is clearly designed to alert some-
body that something is afoot, so it can be anticipated that there will be an
adverse effect on the client.
E2K Model Rule 1.16, however, also allows a withdrawal if the cli-
ent is persisting "in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer has reason to believe is criminal or fraudulent"' 46 or if
"the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud" 47 or the client insists upon "taking action that the lawyer consid-
ers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagree-
ment,"l 48 or when "other good cause of withdrawal exists." 49 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the withdrawal under E2K Model Rule 1.16 is
never mandatory; it is always discretionary.
Even E2K, however, does not help much in what you may say.
While on the one hand it indicates, in comments only, that you may
"withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the
like,"so nothing in the black letter law permits this in the context of fraud
client, not client's owners, not successor counsel.
2. Under Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1), the lawyer must withdraw from any repre-
sentation of the client.
3. Because in this case the mere withdrawal from the representation will not put
the bank on notice that something is wrong, the lawyer also must advise the bank
that the lawyer's previous opinion is withdrawn in order to comply with Rule
1.2(d).
4. The client's preemptive firing of its lawyer did not eliminate the lawyer's "noisy
withdrawal" option under the comment to Rule 1.6.
5. But, if the client does not intend any future fraud, the lawyer cannot make a noi-
sy withdrawal, cannot withdraw the opinion, or otherwise alert anyone to the previ-
ous fraud because of Rule 1.6.
14s E2K Model Rule 1.16(b)(1).
" E2K Model Rule 1. 16(b)(2).
14 E2K Model Rule 1. 16(b)(3).
'4 E2K Model Rule 1. 16(b)(4).
E2K Model Rule 1. 16(b)(7).
15 E2K Model Rule 1.6, Comment 14. This comment states:
"If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course
of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule
1.16(a)(1). After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclo-
sure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. Neither
this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice
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or financial harm (remember, the proposal that would have permitted this
was defeated by a 63% vote). Thus, while you can withdraw because of
client fraud (E2K Model Rule 1.16), the Model Rules do not let you to
reveal any confidential information (E2K Model Rule 1.6). Moreover,
the comments, but not the black letter of E2K Model Rule 1.6, indicate
that whether "other law" requires disclosure prohibited by E2K Model
Rule 1.6 is "beyond the scope of these Rules." 1 This is not much help in
determining whether judicial decisions that allow nonclients to sue for
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or silence are "law" that can trump
the duty of confidentiality. For example, one "other law" may well be the
Sarbarnes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the SEC rules adopted in early 2003.
The attitude of the SEC is reflected, in part, by the statements of its for-
mer Chairman, Harvey Pitt, who told the American Bar Association,
"Lawyers for public companies represent the company as a whole and its
shareholder-owners, not the managers who hire and fire them."
Then, of course, there's the not-so-slight problem of insurance cov-
erage. Will your malpractice insurer cover you if:
your client sues you for revealing a confidence through a noisy
withdrawal?
- a nonclient sues you for not engaging in a noisy withdrawal?
Thus, trying to do a noisy withdrawal in states that adopt the ABA
E2K Model Rules intact may be as difficult as Odysseus' task of steering
between Scylla and Charybdis.152 No wonder that one commentator
wrote, 16 years ago, the trouble with Rule 1.6 and the noisy withdrawal
of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opin-
ion, document, affirmation, or the like. Where the client is an organization, the
lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out
by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this
Rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule
1.13(b)."
151 This language is found in E2K Model Rule 1.6, Comment 10, which reads:
"Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether
such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these
Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be
required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the ex-
tent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and re-
quires disclosure, paragraph (b)(4) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as
are necessary to comply with the law."
152 As you recall, both were monsters of Greek legend between whom Odysseus had to
steer in the Strait of Messina. Scylla, who ate several of Odysseus' seaman, had "the face
and breast of a woman, but from her flanks grew six dog-heads and twelve dog-feet," and
she had a serpentine tail. Charybdis, a daughter of Poseidon and Gaia, was turned into a
monster by Zeus and lived in a cave opposite Scylla. This quotation is a translation of
Apollodorus E7.20-21, as found at www.theoi.com/pontos/skvlla.html.
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comment "is that some fools may not understand that Rule 1.6 does not
mean what it seems to mean." 53
21. Conclusion
We should not deceive ourselves into believing that we are "ethical"
lawyers because we have not directly violated the Model Rule or even
some version of a state's ethical code of "code of professionalism" or
"code of civility." We should not be surprised when the public looks
askance at lawyers and questions their ethics when the core Rules permit
misdirection, bluffing, and even lying (on all "non-material" issues) in
furtherance of the client's interest. We should not be shocked if courts
find ways to impose liability on lawyers to those who are not their cli-
ents, even if there is extensive limitation language in opinion letters or
even in the absence of any written opinion to the third party.
There is an inherent tension between the duty to represent a client
and the duty to the profession. There is a practical tension in wanting to
get the best deal possible for your side and the duty of ethical fair deal-
ing. There is a discernable difference between conduct that is permitted
outside of litigation as compared to conduct that can be sanctioned for
lawyers during litigation. The fact that the ABA (and therefore Louisi-
ana) has failed to adopt the same rules for non-litigation and litigation
negotiations does not mean that the rules may not change in the future.
It can be anticipated that losing parties may bring lawsuits concern-
ing lawyers' roles in negotiations, and we should not be surprised if a set
of rules emerges jurisprudentially. Likewise, we should not be surprised
if these court-developed rules reflect the higher standards imposed upon
litigation-related conduct, whether or not the negotiations occurred be-
fore or after a suit was filed.
We should strive to equate professionalism with ethics; the entire
goal of law as an honorable profession is to have a higher standard than
exists in the marketplace. Two quotes illustrate this proposition. The first
is from a case from Michigan:
Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he
would deal in the marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater
honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might
not be in the interest of the client or his estate. 571 F.Supp. 507,
512.154
1s3 Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., "Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm," 33 Emory L.J. 271, 306 (1984), quoted by Pope and Pope, supra, 63
Def. Counsel J. at 543.
15 Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage Co., 571 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.
Michigan 1983). See also, Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704
(1962); Newman v. Fjelstad, 271 Minn. 514, 137 N.W.2d 181 (1965); Simons v. Shiek's,
Inc., 275 Minn. 132, 145 N.W.2d 548 (1966); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Fell, 51 Ohio St. 2d
33, 364 N.E.2d 872 (1977).
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The other is from a seminal article on legal ethics by a Louisiana-
trained lawyer and judge:
If he is a professional and not merely a hired, albeit skilled hand, the
lawyer is not free to do anything his client might do in the same cir-
cumstances. The corollary of that proposition does set a minimum
standard: the lawyer must be at least as candid and honest as his cli-
ent would be required to be. The agent of the client, that is, his at-
torney-at-law, mtt not perpetrate the kind of fraud or deception
that would vitiate a bargain if practiced by his principal. Beyond
that, the profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard
for attorneys' professional relationships with courts, other lawyers
and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith. An-
other lawyer, or a layman, who deals with a lawyer should not need
to exercise the same degree of caution that he would if trading for
reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar. It is inherent in
the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that it is
morally binding on the conscience of the professional, and not
merely a rule of the game adopted because other players observe (or
fail to adopt) the same rule. Good conduct exacts more than mere
convenience. It is not sufficient to call on personal self-interest; this
is the standard created by the thesis that the same adversary met to-
day may be faced again tomorrow, and one had best not prejudice
that future engagement. 55
Lawyers should stand apart not merely by their training but by their
behavior and the mutual philosophical principles to which they hold one
another. It is submitted that one day we will look back upon the current
trend of distinguishing "ethics" and "professionalism" as perhaps mis-
guided and counterproductive. To say that the Model Rules are "ethics"
is to denigrate ethics, and to distinguish "ethics" from "professionalism"
is to confuse both.
We should strive for the day when all who bear the title of "lawyer"
are seen as ethical professionals.
One may not agree with those who contend that the ethical basis of
negotiations (or any extra-tribunal actions) should be one of truth and
fair dealing, that as professionals lawyers should "not accept a result that
is unconscionably unfair to the other party."156 Yet, it would be hard to
argue with a more practical formulation, given the serious possibility that
a single standard will ultimately evolve jurisprudentially:
If you wouldn't do something in a courtroom context, if you
wouldn't make a misleading statement in a settlement conference
1ss Judge Alvin B. Rubin, writing in 35 La.L.Rev. 577 at 589 (1975), A Causerie on
Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation.
156 Judge Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiation, 35 Louisiana
Law Rev. at pg. 591 (1975).
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with a judge, and if you wouldn't remain silent about a misstate-
ment made by your client or partner during discussions in court
chambers or in open court, then you shouldn't do any of these
things in non-litigation negotiations of any kind
FOE1.;) GCCQORC
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